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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he freedom . . . of the press”1 specially protects the press as an 
industry,2 which is to say newspapers, television stations, and the like—
so have argued some judges and scholars, such as the Citizens United v. 
FEC dissenters3 and Justices Stewart,4 Powell,5 and Douglas.6  This ar-
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 One could equally say “press as an occupation,” “press as a trade,” or “press as an 
institution.” 
3 The dissent argued that “we learn from [the Free Press Clause] that the drafters 
of the First Amendment did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of 
‘speakers,’ or speech outlets or forms,” and that “[t]he text and history” of the Free 
Press Clause thus “suggest[] why one type of corporation, those that are part of the 
press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status.”  130 S. Ct. 876, 951 n.57 
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Based on this, the dissent concluded that restrictions 
on the Free Speech Clause rights of nonpress entities can thus be upheld without 
threatening the special Free Press Clause rights of the institutional press.  Id. 
4 See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (arguing 
that the Free Press Clause should be read as specially protecting the press-as-industry 
because “[t]he primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . 
to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the 
three official branches”). 
5 See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (as-
suming a press-as-industry premise in arguing that “[t]he Constitution specifically se-
lected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
6 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that professional journalists are constitutionally entitled to a privilege not to testify 
about their sources because the press-as-industry “has a preferred position in our con-
stitutional scheme”); see also Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 931-32 (1992) (endorsing Justice Stewart’s historical 
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gument is made in many contexts:  election-related speech, libel law, 
the journalist’s privilege, access to government property, and more.  
Some lower courts have indeed concluded that some First Amend-
ment constitutional protections apply only to the institutional press, 
and not to book authors, political advertisers, writers of letters to the 
editor, professors who post material on their websites, or people who 
are interviewed by newspaper reporters.7 
Sometimes, this argument is used to support weaker protection for 
non-institutional-press speakers than is already given to institutional-press 
speakers.  At other times, it is used to support greater protection for insti-
tutional-press speakers than they already get.  The argument in the latter 
set of cases is that the greater protection can be limited to institutional-
press speakers, and so will undermine rival government interests less than 
if the greater protection were extended to all speakers. 
But other judges and scholars—including the Citizens United ma-
jority8 and Justice Brennan9—have argued that the “freedom . . . of the 
press” does not protect the press-as-industry, but rather protects eve-
ryone’s use of the printing press (and its modern equivalents) as a 
technology.10  People or organizations who occasionally rent the tech-
 
claim); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions:  Some Easy Answers and 
Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007) (“The Press Clause singles out the 
press as an institution entitled to special protection under the umbrella of the First 
Amendment.”); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027-
29 (2011) (taking a similar view). 
7 For a discussion of these cases, which involve the journalist’s privilege, libel law, 
and media access to government and private property, see infra Sections VII.A-B and D. 
8 130 S. Ct. at 905 (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institu-
tional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 928 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring) (buttressing this claim 
with a discussion of the text of the Free Press Clause).  For additional Supreme Court 
cases so holding, see infra Section VI.B. 
9 See infra note 303 (collecting such quotes from Justice Brennan and others arguing 
against treating media and nonmedia libel defendants differently for First Amendment 
purposes); see also cases cited infra note 321 (collecting recent lower court cases rejecting 
special protection for the press-as-industry); see also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (2002) (“To the generation of the Framers of the First 
Amendment, ‘the press’ meant ‘the printing press.’  It referred less to a journalistic en-
terprise than to the technology of printing and the opportunities for communication 
that the technology created.  ‘Freedom of the press’ referred to the freedom of the peo-
ple to publish their views, rather than the freedom of journalists to pursue their craft.”). 
10 I speak here of communications technologies that today serve the role the print-
ing press did in the 1700s, not just of the printing press as such.  “It is not strange that 
‘press,’ the word for what was then the sole means of broad dissemination of ideas and 
news, would be used to describe the freedom to communicate with a large, unseen au-
dience,” even using new technologies that were not known to the Framers.  First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 n.5 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  
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nology, for instance by buying newspaper space, broadcast time, or 
the services of a printing company, are just as protected as newspaper 
publishers or broadcasters.11 
Under this approach, the First Amendment rights of the institutional 
press and of other speakers rise and fall together.  Sometimes, this ap-
proach is used to support protection for non-institutional-press speakers 
and to resist calls for lowering that protection below the level offered to 
institutional-press speakers.  At other times, it is used to rebut demands 
for greater protection:  Extending such protection to all speakers, the ar-
gument goes, would excessively undermine rival government interests—
yet allowing such protection only for the institutional press would im-
properly give the institutional press special rights.12 
Both sides in the debate often appeal at least partly to the constitu-
tional text and its presumed original meaning.  The words “the press” 
in the First Amendment must mean the institutional press, says one 
side.  The words must mean press-as-technology, says the other.  Citizens 
United is unlikely to settle the question, given how sharply the four dis-
senters and many outside commentators have disagreed with the major-
ity.  So who is right?  What light does the “history” referred to by the Cit-
izens United dissent shed on the “text”13 and the Framers’ “purpose”?14 
The answer, it turns out, is that people during the Framing era 
likely understood the text as fitting the press-as-technology model—as 
securing the right of every person to use communications technology, 
and not just securing a right belonging exclusively to members of the 
publishing industry.  The text was likely not understood as treating 
the press-as-industry differently from other people who wanted to rent 
or borrow the press-as-technology on an occasional basis. 
Parts I, II, and III set forth the evidence on this subject from the 
Framing era and the surrounding decades.  Part I discusses, among 
other things, early reference works and state constitutions that de-
 
The printing press itself was understood during the Framing era as a technological in-
novation, and existing rights were understood as being adaptable to technological in-
novations.  See THOMAS HAYTER, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS CHIEFLY AS IT 
REFLECTS PERSONAL SLANDER 3-4 (London, J. Raymond 1754); FRANCIS LUDLOW 
HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 38-39 (photo. reprint 1978) (1812). 
11 Alternatively, one could conclude that people who rent such access become 
members of the press-as-industry for those occasions.  But then the results would be the 
same as under the press-as-technology view, because anyone who occasionally uses the 
press as a technology would be treated the same as members of the press-as-industry. 
12 See, e.g., cases cited infra Section VI.B. 
13 See supra note 3. 
14 See Stewart, supra note 4, at 634. 
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scribed the freedom of the press as a right of “every freeman,” “every 
man,” or “every citizen.”  This right was generally seen as the right to 
publish using mass technology, as opposed to the freedom of speech, 
which was seen at the time as focusing more on in-person speech. 
Part II discusses the Framing-era understanding that the freedom of 
the press extended to authors of books and pamphlets—authors who 
were generally not members of the press-as-industry,15 though they did 
use the press as technology.  Part III goes on to discuss fifteen cases 
from 1784 to 1840 that treated the freedom of the press as extending 
equally to all people who used press technology, and not just to mem-
bers of the press-as-industry.  To my knowledge, these cases have not 
been discussed before in this context.  Each of the sources standing 
alone may not be dispositive.  But put together, they point powerfully 
toward the press-as-technology reading, under which all users of mass 
communications technologies have the same freedom of the press. 
Part IV turns to how the “freedom . . . of the press” was understood 
around 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  Much re-
cent scholarship has suggested that originalist analyses of Bill of Rights 
provisions applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment should 
consider the original understanding as of 1868 in addition to that of 
1791.16  And it turns out that around 1868, it was even clearer that the 
“freedom . . . of the press” secured a right to use the press-as-
technology, with no special protection for the press-as-industry.  Part V 
offers evidence that this remained true from 1880 to 1930. 
Part VI then looks at how the Supreme Court has understood 
“freedom . . . of the press” since 1931, the first year that the Court 
struck down government action on First Amendment grounds.  
Throughout that time, the press-as-technology view has continued to 
be dominant.  Many Supreme Court cases have officially endorsed this 
view.  No Supreme Court case has rejected this view, though some 
cases have suggested the question remains open. 
Part VII turns to how the “freedom . . . of the press” has been un-
derstood by lower courts since 1931, and concludes that the press-as-
technology view has been dominant there as well.  The first lower 
court decisions I could find adopting the press-as-industry view did not 
 
15 See infra Section II.A. 
16 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 145, 175-77 (2008); Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and Politi-
cal Theory:  Comments on Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and the Right to Arms, 12 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 327-30 (2004) (book review); Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Def-
amation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 659-63 (2008). 
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appear until the 1970s.  Even since then, only a handful of cases have 
adopted such a view, and many more have rejected it.  (The press-as-
industry cases that this Part identifies could also be helpful as test cas-
es for any future work that discusses the policy advantages and disad-
vantages of the press-as-industry model.) 
None of the evidence I describe specifically deals with corpora-
tions, the particular speakers involved in Citizens United, but it does 
show that the institutional media has historically been seen as the 
equal of other people and organizations for purposes of the “free-
dom . . . of the press.”  The constitutional protections offered to the 
institutional media have long been understood—in the early republic, 
around 1868, from 1868 to 1970, and in the great bulk of cases since 
1970 as well—as being no greater than those offered to others. 
Finally, the Conclusion briefly discusses what effect this analysis 
should have on the Court’s interpretation of the Free Press Clause.  
Of course, text, original meaning, tradition, and precedent have never 
been the Supreme Court’s sole guides.  But any calls for specially pro-
tecting the press-as-industry have to look to sources other than text, 
original meaning, tradition, and precedent for support. 
I.  EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE FRAMING:  THE FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS AS A RIGHT OF “EVERY FREEMAN” 
A.  Cases, Treatises, and Constitutions 
Early formulations of the freedom of the press spoke of it as a 
right of every “freeman,” “citizen,” or “individual.”  These formula-
tions often set forth narrow substantive views of the “freedom of the 
press.”  But, whatever the scope of the right, it belonged to everyone 
(or at least all free citizens). 
Blackstone, for instance, wrote in 1769 that “[e]very freeman has an 
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public:  
to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press.”17  Jean-Louis de 
Lolme, an author widely cited by 1780s American writers, likewise 
wrote in his chapter on “Liberty of the Press” that “[e]very subject in 
England has not only a right to present petitions, to the King, or the 
Houses of Parliament; but he has a right also to lay his complaints and 
 
17 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (emphasis added); see also David 
Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 99 (1975) (“The emphasis in 
‘freedom of the press’ was upon unrestrained dissemination of thought and the right 
belonged not merely to ‘the press’ but to ‘every free man.’”). 
VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  5:47 PM 
466 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 459 
observations before the Public, by the means of an open press.”18  The 
right to present petitions, of course, was not limited to the press as an 
industry, but really did belong to “[e]very subject.”  De Lolme’s expla-
nation suggests that the right to speak to the public via “an open 
press” likewise extended to all subjects, whether or not they used the 
printing press for a living. 
State supreme courts in 1788 and 1791 similarly described the lib-
erty of the press as “permitting every man to publish his opinions,”19 
and as meaning that “the citizen has a right to publish his sentiments 
upon all political, as well as moral and literary subjects.”20  Justice Ire-
dell described the liberty of the press in 1799 as meaning that “[e]very 
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases be-
fore the public.”21  St. George Tucker, in 1803, defined the “freedom 
of the press” as meaning that “[e]very individual, certainly, has a right 
to speak, or publish, his sentiments on the measures of government.”22 
Several early state constitutions echoed this as well, providing that 
“[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of that liberty.”23  Likewise, Justice Story, who 
 
18 J. L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 280 (London, T. Spilsbury 
1775) (emphasis added).  De Lolme is tied for third on Donald Lutz’s list of the most-
cited authors in 1780s American political writing, behind Blackstone and Montes-
quieu, and tied with Cesare Beccaria and with Trenchard and Gordon of Cato’s Letters.  
Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century Ameri-
can Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 193 (1984). 
19 Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788) (emphasis added). 
20 Commonwealth v. Freeman, HERALD OF FREEDOM (Boston), Mar. 18, 1791, at 5 
(Mass. 1791) (emphasis added). 
21 In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 839 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 
5126) (grand jury charge) (emphasis added) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *151). 
22 2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 28 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William 
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER] (emphasis added). 
23 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 
1792, art. I, § 5 (“The press shall be free to every citizen, who undertakes to examine 
the official conduct of men acting in a public capacity; and any citizen may print on 
any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. 
XII, § 7 (“[P]rinting presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine 
the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of Government . . . and every citizen 
may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of 
that liberty.”); Sovchik v. Roberts, No. 3090-M, 2001 WL 490015, at *3 n.1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. May 9, 2001) (interpreting similar provision in Ohio Constitution and conclud-
ing that “the plain language of the constitutional provision ‘[e]very citizen’ cannot 
reasonably be construed as applying only to members of the media”), quoted approvingly 
in Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ohio 2001). 
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wrote in 1833 but who had learned the law in the decade following the 
enactment of the Bill of Rights, described the First Amendment as 
providing that “every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his 
opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so 
always, that he does not injure any other person . . . or attempt to sub-
vert the government.”24  These references to a right of “every freeman,” 
“every man,” “every citizen,” and “every individual” appear to refer to 
every person’s right to use printing technology.  They are much less 
consistent with the notion that the right gave special protection to the 
few men who were members of a particular industry. 
Some early state constitutions mentioned both the “every citizen” 
phrase and, separately, the “liberty of speech, or of the press,”25 but as 
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 shows, these formulations did 
not describe separate rights.  The Pennsylvania text read, “That the 
people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publish-
ing their sentiments:  therefore the freedom of the press ought not to 
be restrained,”26 which suggests that the freedom of the press was a re-
statement of the right of “the people” to publish. 
Early cases, such as the 1803 Runkle v. Meyer decision, likewise treat 
the “liberty of the press” as equivalent to the provision that “every citi-
zen may freely speak, write and print on any subject.”27  And St. 
 
24 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
732 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (emphasis added).  Noah Webster’s influential 
1828 American dictionary likewise defined “liberty of the press” as “the free right of pub-
lishing books, pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right 
which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to pun-
ishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state.”  2 NOAH 
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 
1828) (under “press”).  Another definition in the same dictionary, listed under “liberty,” 
was much the same:  “freedom from any restriction on the power to publish books; the 
free power of publishing what one pleases, subject only to punishment for abusing the 
privilege, or publishing what is mischievous to the public or injurious to individuals.”  Id. 
25 See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, §§ 5–6 (protecting the right of “[e]very 
citizen [to] write and publish his sentiment on all subjects” and prohibiting any law 
from “curtail[ing] or restrain[ing] the liberty of speech or of the press”); N.Y. CONST. 
of 1821, art. 7, § VIII (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his senti-
ments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be 
passed, to restrain, or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”). 
26 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, para. XII.  For a discussion of three New York court 
cases that were decided within a few years of the enactment of article 7, section VIII of 
the New York Constitution of 1821 and take the press-as-technology view, see infra sub-
sections III.B.3-4 and III.C.2. 
27 See 3 Yeates 518, 519 (Pa. 1803) (quoting the Pennsylvania Constitution’s state-
ment that “every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject” in explaining 
what the court saw as the proper understanding of “liberty of the press”). 
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George Tucker, Chancellor Kent, and Justice Joseph Story all treated 
the First Amendment phrase “freedom of the speech, and of the 
press” as interchangeable with the state constitutional provisions that 
“every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments.”28 
B.  The Structure of the Framing-Era Newspaper Industry 
The view that “freedom of the press” covers “every citizen,” even 
people who aren’t members of the publishing industry, also makes 
sense given how many important authors of the time were not mem-
bers of that industry. 
Newspapers of the era were small enterprises, with few or no em-
ployees.29  Woodward and Bernstein were many decades in the future; 
Framing-era newspapers didn’t do sustained investigative journalism.30 
And while those newspapers doubtless contributed facts and opin-
ions to public debate, some of the most important such contributions 
in newspapers came from people who were not publishers, printers, 
editors, or their employees—Madison, Hamilton, and Jay’s The Federal-
 
28 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 14 (New York, O. Halsted 
1827); see also 3 STORY, supra note 24, at 732-33; 2 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 11-14.  
The Justices have often accepted these treatises as evidence of the original meaning of 
the Constitution.  See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 799 
(1995); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977, 982 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J.); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment). 
 The sources discussed in the text also suggest that the change from Madison’s 
proposed constitutional amendment—“the people shall not be deprived or abridged 
of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the 
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable,” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
434 (1789) ( Joseph Gales ed., 1834)—to the briefer First Amendment language 
(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”) 
was not understood as affecting the substance of the protection.  The freedom of 
speech or of the press was seen as equivalent to the people’s right to speak, to write, or 
to publish their sentiments. 
29 See, e.g., FREDERIC HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1690 TO 
1872, at 136 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1873) (noting that printers and editors of the 
era lacked a “staff of paid writers”); FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM:  A 
HISTORY OF NEWSPAPERS IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH 250 YEARS, 1690 TO 1940, at 
115-16 (1941) (describing how the publisher of the first American daily newspaper 
“[u]ndoubtedly . . . did all the work on his paper himself during at least part of [1783–
1784], even . . . selling it on the street”). 
30 See Anderson, supra note 9, at 446-47 (“The concept of press as journalism can-
not claim a historical pedigree.  When the First Amendment was written, journalism as 
we know it did not exist.  The press in the eighteenth century was a trade of printers, 
not journalists.”). 
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ist essays are a classic example.31  “[N]ot a few of the country edi-
tors . . . depended for what literary work their vocation demanded up-
on the assistance of friends who liked being ‘contributors to the press’ 
without fee.”32 
It seems unlikely that the Framers would have secured a special 
right limited to this small industry, an industry that included only part 
of the major contributors to public debate.  This is especially so given 
that some of the most powerful and wealthy contributors, such as the 
politicians and planters who wrote so much of the important published 
material, weren’t part of the industry.  Some eighteenth-century Ameri-
can political figures—such as the young Benjamin Franklin and Repre-
sentative Matthew Lyon, one of the targets of a Sedition Act prosecu-
tion—were indeed newspapermen, but they were rare exceptions. 
Political elites sometimes secure rights for themselves.  They 
sometimes secure rights for the whole public.  But it seems unlikely 
that they would have secured rights for a class of tradesmen who were 
generally poorer and less powerful than the elites, and would have 
denied those rights to themselves and to people of their class.  Rather, 
as William Livingston—who later became a governor of New Jersey 
and a delegate to the Constitutional Convention—wrote in his 1753 
essay titled Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, one of the great 
benefits provided by “the Art of Printing” and “the Invention of the 
Press” is that “the Press” could be used by “Writers of every Character 
and Genius,” including “[t]he Patriot,” “[t]he Divine” (i.e., the cler-
gyman), “the Philosopher, the Moralist, the Lawyer, and Men of every 
other Profession and Character, whose Sentiments may be diffused 
with the greatest Ease and Dispatch.”33 
To be sure, the Framers praised newspapers, sometimes extrava-
gantly so; consider Jefferson’s statement that, “were it left to me to de-
cide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or 
 
31 Nor were these statements necessarily endorsed by the newspaper publishers to 
the point that they could be seen as an expression of the publishers’ own views.  See, 
e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at 70-75 (2010) (describing the public pressures that kept many anti-Federalist 
essays from being published, and describing how some tried to counteract those pres-
sures by publishing the materials without endorsing them as their own opinions). 
32 MOTT, supra note 29, at 162; see also DONALD H. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION 
PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 20 (1969) (stating, in reference to American news-
papers of that era generally, that “[s]ubscribers’ pens provided a large proportion of 
the items in these gazettes,” mostly “discuss[ing] political subjects”). 
33 William Livingston, Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, INDEP. REFLECTOR, 
Aug. 30, 1753, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 336, 336-37 (Milton M. Klein 
ed., 1963). 
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newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to 
prefer the latter.”34  But Jefferson spoke of newspapers, not newspa-
permen.  There is no reason to think his praise, or the Free Press 
Clause, excluded newspapers as a means of propagating the views of 
authors who weren’t part of the press-as-industry but who occasionally 
submitted their articles for publication. 
It’s theoretically conceivable that a right of “every person” to pub-
lish using the press might refer only to the right of every person—
including Livingston’s clergyman, philosopher, moralist, or lawyer—to 
buy a printing press and to start printing using that press, or perhaps 
to start a regular newspaper published on someone else’s press.  Once 
a person buys the press or starts a newspaper, the theory would go, 
what the person publishes with it would be protected by the freedom 
of the press.  But until then, the freedom of the press does not cover 
any article the person submits to a newspaper, or any leaflet that the 
person pays a printer to print. 
This, though, seems like an odd understanding of the “undoubted 
right” of “[e]very freeman” “to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public.”35  Buying a press and hiring a printer to operate it—or 
starting a newspaper and hiring an editor—was an expensive and 
cumbersome means of laying your sentiments before the public. 
Indeed, even rich and influential American politicians did not 
take such steps.  If they wanted to publish something, they would 
submit it to a newspaper (for a famous example, consider Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jay’s The Federalist), or help pay for its publication as a 
pamphlet (as Hamilton did for the second edition of The Federalist, 
and as Thomas Paine did for Common Sense).36 
Again, one can imagine a notion of the “undoubted right” of 
“[e]very freeman” “to lay what sentiments he pleases before the pub-
lic” under which those publications were not seen as protected by the 
author’s freedom of the press—so that authors who really wanted such 
protection (for instance, against a libel lawsuit, libel prosecution, or 
injunction) had to buy their own presses or start their own newspa-
pers, which they almost never did.  But the cases, commentaries, and 
 
34 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in 
2 MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 84, 85 
(Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., London, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1829).  
35 See supra note 17. 
36 See infra note 69.  In the early republic, a few politicians helped fund partisan 
newspapers.  But this was done by only a few political leaders, and I have seen no reason 
to think that it was done to get the politicians special protections against legal liability. 
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Framing-era practice do not suggest that anyone at the time had such 
an odd understanding of what “[e]very freeman[’s]” “right” meant. 
C.  The (Possibly) Dissenting Sources 
I have found only two early sources that could be read as support-
ing a view that the liberty of the press might belong only to printers or 
newspaper publishers, though both include language that points in 
both directions. 
The first source is Francis Ludlow Holt’s The Law of Libel (1812), 
which says that “[t]he liberty of the press . . . is only one of the per-
sonal rights of the printer.”37  But other parts of the same chapter sug-
gest that Holt viewed the right as belonging to authors—including 
ones who aren’t printers or their employees—and not just printers. 
Two pages later, Holt defines “[t]he liberty of the press” as “the 
personal liberty of the writer to express his thoughts in the more 
[im]proved way invented by human ingenuity in the form of the 
press.”38  He likewise describes the “liberty of the press” as “what is 
necessarily included in its equivalent and progressive terms, thinking, 
speaking, and writing,”39 as “one of the forms of the liberty of speech 
and communication,”40 and later in the book as “[t]he natural liberty 
of the people” to engage in “opinion, . . . inquiry, and . . . discussion” 
about Parliament.41  And Holt notes that “with a very few exceptions, 
whatever any one has a right both to think and to speak, he has like-
wise a consequential right to print and to publish.”42  This seems more 
consistent with all speakers’ and writers’ right to express their views 
using the press-as-technology, rather than with a right limited to the 
few people who are members of the press-as-industry. 
The second source is a civics schoolbook called First Lessons in Civil 
Government (1843), in which the author writes, with regard to the New 
York Constitution, 
The section which remains to be noticed, is that which secures to all the 
right “freely to speak, write, and publish their sentiments;” that is, the lib-
 
37 HOLT, supra note 10, at 36. 
38 Id. at 38 (emphasis added).  The original reads “the more approved,” but the 
author must have meant “the more improved,” and the 1816 revision makes that cor-
rection.  FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 51 (London, J. Butterworth et al. 
2d ed. 1816). 
39 HOLT, supra note 10, at 37. 
40 Id. at 45. 
41 Id. at 128. 
42 Id. at 46-47. 
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erty of speech and of the press.  A press is a machine for printing; but the 
word is also used to signify the business of printing and publishing; 
hence liberty of the press is the free right to publish books or papers 
without restraint.
43
 
This too is ambiguous.  The first sentence speaks of a right of “all,” 
and the “free right to publish books or papers” could be read as a 
right of all, since “publishing” was a general term for what authors did 
and not just for what printers did.44  But the “business of printing and 
publishing” clause suggests that the right is limited to those in the 
press-as-industry. 
Yet however one reads these two sources, I think they do not over-
come the evidence of the other sources mentioned earlier in this Part, 
coupled with the sources discussed below.45 
D.  The Grammatical Structure of “the Freedom of Speech, or of the Press” 
The grammatical structure of the First Amendment likewise sug-
gests that the freedom was the freedom “of every freeman” or “every 
citizen” to use the press-as-technology, and not a freedom belonging to 
the press-as-industry. 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Citizens United, the shared words 
“freedom of” in the phrase the “freedom of speech, or of the press” 
are most reasonably understood as playing the same role for both 
“speech” and “press.”46  The “freedom of speech” is freedom to engage 
in an activity, much like “freedom of movement” or “freedom of reli-
gion.”  In particular, it is the freedom to use the faculty of speech.  
 
43 ANDREW W. YOUNG, FIRST LESSONS IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT:  INCLUDING A COM-
PREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 155 (Auburn, N.Y., 
H. & J.C. Ivison 10th ed. 1843) (citing N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. 7, § VIII).  Another 
edition says, with regard to the Ohio Constitution, that “the liberty of speech and of the 
press” is the right “to speak, write, or print upon any subject, as he thinks proper . . . . 
The word press here signifies the business of printing and publishing; hence liberty of 
the press is the right to publish books and papers without restraint.”  ANDREW W. 
YOUNG, FIRST LESSONS IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT:  INCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF OHIO 139 (Cleveland, M.C. Younglove 1848) (cit-
ing OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 6).  
44 See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1081-82 (2009) (explaining the Framing-era under-
standing that “publishing” meant communicating something to the public). 
45 See infra Parts II and III. 
46 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that “no one” thought the First Amendment meant “everyone’s right to speak 
or the institutional press’s right to publish”); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 
GA. L. REV. 309, 345-46 (2008) (“The construction makes it likely that the Framers 
meant ‘of speech’ and ‘of the press’ to be interpreted in a parallel manner.”). 
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This suggests that “freedom of the press” is likewise freedom to en-
gage in an activity by using the faculty of the printing press. 
This is supported by sources that discuss the “freedom in the use of 
the press.”  Thus, James Madison, in his 1800 Report on the Virginia Res-
olutions, wrote that American law provided “a different degree of free-
dom in the use of the press” than English law did.47  The Massachu-
setts response to the Virginia resolutions replied that the “freedom of 
the press” “is a security for the rational use, and not the abuse of the 
press.”48  St. George Tucker’s influential 1803 work, in discussing the 
freedom of the press, spoke of “[w]hoever makes use of the press as 
the vehicle of his sentiments on any subjects.”49  The freedom of the 
press was “freedom in the use of the press,” much as freedom of 
speech was freedom in the use of speech. 
Likewise, Madison’s Report also quoted a phrase from Virginia’s 
ratifying convention:  “We, the Delegates of the people of Virginia . . . 
declare and make known . . . that among other essential rights, the 
liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, 
restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.”50  Again, 
the phrase “the liberty of” is seen as applying equally to “conscience” 
and “the press.”  Here too this suggests that, just as the liberty of con-
science was seen during that era as each person’s freedom to worship 
or to think and speak as he wished on religious matters,51 so the liberty 
of the press meant each person’s freedom to publish.52 
 
47 JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES (1800), reprinted in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 570 ( Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelph-
ia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also Lee, supra 
note 46, at 342 (“The inclusion of the word ‘use’ in . . . ‘freedom in the use of the 
press’ makes it unmistakably clear that Madison . . . w[as] referring to the machine of 
the printing press.”). 
48 Reply of the Legislature to Resolutions of the State of Virginia, ch. 119, 1798 
Gen. Court, Jan. Sess. (Mass. 1799), 1798–1799 Mass. Acts 257, 260, reprinted in 4  
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 533, 535. 
49 2 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 29. 
50 MADISON, supra note 47, at 576 (quoting Form of Ratification, 1788 Ratifying 
Convention (Va. 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 656). 
51 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII (treating “liberty of conscience” as synon-
ymous with “the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship”); 
HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 41 (Philadelphia, 
The Aurora Office 1799) (defining the constitutional “freedom of religion” “to mean 
the power uncontrolled by law of professing and publishing any opinions on religious 
topics, which any individual may choose to profess or publish, and of supporting those 
opinions by any statements he may think proper to make”).  George Hay was appoint-
ed U.S. Attorney for the District of Virginia in 1803 and eventually finished his career 
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Of course, “freedom of” is also sometimes used in the possessive 
sense to refer to the freedom of a particular group.  One might, for 
instance, speak of “the freedom of Americans to speak,”53 or “the free-
dom of Catholics to practice their religion.”54 
But writers generally don’t yoke together two such different mean-
ings with the same words:  it would be odd for “the freedom of” in 
“the freedom of speech, or of the press” to mean one thing in the first 
part of the phrase (i.e., everyone’s freedom to use the faculty of 
speech) and a different thing in the second part (i.e., the freedom be-
longing to a particular group, the press-as-industry).55  And as the 
sources mentioned in Part III suggest, the First Amendment was not 
read in this odd way—the freedom of the press was understood as the 
freedom of everyone to publish, just as the freedom of speech was the 
freedom of everyone to speak. 
 
as a federal judge. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:  Hay, George, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1006 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
52 “Freedom of the press” was also sometimes yoked with “licentiousness of the 
press,” but “licentiousness of the press” was understood as including publications by 
people who were using the press-as-technology, and not just by members of the press-
as-industry.  Thus, for instance, Judge Mansfield’s oft-quoted statement that “[t]he lib-
erty of the press consists in printing without any previous license, subject to the conse-
quences of law” while “[t]he licentiousness of the press is Pandora’s box, the source of 
every evil” came in his opinion justifying the conviction of a clergyman who had pub-
lished a pamphlet using the press-as-technology, but who was not a member of the 
press-as-industry.  R v. Shipley (The Dean of St. Asaph’s Case), (1784) 99 Eng. Rep. 774 
(K.B.) 824; 4 Dougl. 73, 170; see also infra subsection III.A.1.  Likewise, Judge Chase’s 
statement that the Sedition Act was “a law to check this licentiousness of the press” 
came in charging the jury in Thomas Cooper’s trial for publishing a leaflet, not a 
newspaper article.  United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865); see also infra subsection III.B.1.  Cato’s Letters similarly 
argued that oppressors “have been loud in their Complaints against Freedom of 
Speech, and the Licence of the Press; and always restrained, or endeavoured to re-
strain, both.  In consequence of this, they have brow-beaten Writers, punished them 
violently, and against Law, and burnt their Works.”  1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS 
GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 101-02 (London, W. Wilkins et al. 4th ed. 1737).  This is a 
reference to the alleged licentiousness of books (books being more commonly burned 
than newspapers) used as a reason to punish writers of books, and isn’t limited to the 
alleged licentiousness of the institutional press. 
53 E.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 667 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
54 E.g., James Lowell Underwood, The Dawn of Religious Freedom in South Carolina:  
The Journey from Limited Tolerance to Constitutional Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 111, 151 (2002). 
55 See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasen-
tence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2003) (“Absent some very strong reason to 
the contrary, we should conclude that a word or phrase in a particular clause or sen-
tence has the same meaning throughout the clause or sentence.”). 
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E.  Responding to the Redundancy Objection 
The freedom of the press-as-technology, of course, was not seen as 
redundant of the freedom of speech.56  St. George Tucker, for in-
stance, discussed the freedom of speech as focusing on the spoken 
word and the freedom of the press as focusing on the printed: 
The best speech cannot be heard, by any great number of persons.  The 
best speech may be misunderstood, misrepresented, and imperfectly 
remembered by those who are present.  To all the rest of mankind, it is, 
as if it had never been.  The best speech must also be short for the inves-
tigation of any subject of an intricate nature, or even a plain one, if it be 
of more than ordinary length.  The best speech then must be altogether 
inadequate to the due exercise of the censorial power, by the people.  
The only adequate supplementary aid for these defects, is the absolute 
freedom of the press.57 
Likewise, George Hay, who later became a U.S. Attorney and a federal 
judge, wrote in 1799 that “freedom of speech means, in the construc-
tion of the Constitution, the privilege of speaking any thing without 
control” and “the words freedom of the press, which form a part of 
the same sentence, mean the privilege of printing any thing without 
control.”58  Massachusetts Attorney General James Sullivan (1801) sim-
ilarly treated “the freedom of speech” as referring to “utter[ing], in 
words spoken,” and “the freedom of the press” as referring to 
“print[ing] and publish[ing].”59 
And these sources captured an understanding that was broadly 
expressed during the surrounding decades.  Bishop Thomas Hayter, 
writing in 1754, described the “Liberty of the Press” as applying the 
 
56 Justice Stewart argued that the Free Press Clause should be read as protecting 
the press-as-industry since otherwise it would be a “constitutional redundancy.”  Stew-
art, supra note 4, at 633-34; see also West, supra note 6, at 1040-41 (likewise). 
57 2 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 17.  Tucker suggested that other material—such 
as pictures, symbolic expression, and writing—would be protected as well.  Id. at 11-14; 
see also sources cited supra note 28.  But since in-person speech and printing were the 
most common subjects of suppression, and of debates about constitutional protection, 
Tucker naturally focused on those two matters. 
58 HORTENSIUS, supra note 51, at 40-41. 
59 AN IMPARTIAL CITIZEN [JAMES SULLIVAN], A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (Boston, Da-
vid Carlisle 1801).  Sullivan used those phrases in ridiculing an overexpansive view of 
the First Amendment, in which the freedom of the press was read as entirely unlim-
ited; he was arguing for the freedom as being limited to examination of public matters, 
and not to personal slanders.  But in the process he was treating “freedom of speech” 
as referring to the freedom to use spoken words, to whatever extent that might be 
properly limited, and the “freedom of the press” as referring to the freedom to use 
printing technology. 
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traditionally recognized “Use and Liberty of Speech” to “Printing,” an 
activity that Hayter described as “only a more extensive and improved 
Kind of Speech.”60  Hayter’s work was known and quoted in Revolu-
tionary-era America.61 
Similarly, William Bollan (1766) described “printing” as “a species 
of writing invented for the more expeditious multiplication of copies,” 
and asserted that “freedom or restraint of speech and writing upon 
public affairs have generally been concomitant”; because of this, Bollan 
argued, “restraints of writing” were likely to erode the “liberty of 
speech” and not only of writing, and “those who desire to preserve the 
[liberty of speech] ought by all means to take due care of the [freedom 
of writing].”62 And Bollan used “liberty of the press” and “the freedom 
of writing” (in a context suggesting printing) interchangeably.63 
Later, Francis Holt (1812) defined the liberty of the press as “the 
personal liberty of the writer to express his thoughts in the more 
[im]proved way invented by human ingenuity in the form of the 
press.”64  William Rawle (1825) likewise characterized “[t]he press” as 
“a vehicle of the freedom of speech,” adding that “[t]he art of print-
ing illuminates the world, by a rapid dissemination of what would oth-
erwise be slowly communicated and partially understood.”65 
Without the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech might 
not have been viewed as covering printing, given that printing posed 
dangers that ordinary “speech” did not.  Indeed, in the centuries be-
fore the Framing, governments tried to specifically constrain the use 
of the press-as-technology because they found it to be especially 
dangerous.  The free press guarantees made clear that this potential-
 
60 HAYTER, supra note 10, at 8. 
61 See, e.g., Civis, Letter to the Editor, VA. GAZETTE, May 18, 1776, at 1 (“Printing is 
a more extensive and improved kind of speech.”); Letter to the Editor, PA. PACKET & 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 12, 1785, at 2 (same); London, Nov. 7, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 
1786, at 1 (same); London, Oct. 29, CONN. J., Jan. 4, 1786, at 1 (same). 
62 WILLIAM BOLLAN, THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND WRITING UPON PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
CONSIDERED 3-4 (London, S. Baker 1766).  Bollan was “a distinguished Massachusetts 
lawyer who served the colony as its advocate general and then as its agent in England, 
[and] earned John Adams’ praise as ‘a faithful friend of America.’”  FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 83 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).  Bollan’s work was 
quoted in American free press debates shortly before the Revolution.  Id. at 84. 
63 BOLLAN, supra note 62, at 137. 
64 HOLT, supra note 10, at 38; see also Lee, supra note 46, at 344-45 (quoting id.). 
65 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 119 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825). 
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ly dangerous technology was protected alongside direct in-person 
communications.66 
Of course, over the last several decades, the phrase “freedom of 
speech” has often been used to mean “freedom of expression” and to 
encompass all means of communication.  This might have stemmed 
partly from technological change.  New media of communication such 
as radio, films, television, and the Internet may fit more naturally in lay 
English within the term “speech” rather than “press.”  And once some 
mass communication technologies are labeled “speech,” it becomes eas-
ier to label their traditional print equivalent “speech” as well. 
The broadening of the phrase “freedom of speech” might also 
have been aided by the success of the “freedom of the press” clause in 
assuring protection for the press-as-technology.67  Once constitutional 
law applies the same legal rules to spoken and printed communica-
tion, with no extra constraint on the press, it becomes easier to use a 
common label to refer to the common protection. 
But the canon against interpreting legal writings in a way that 
makes one clause redundant of another rests on the notion that the 
authors and ratifiers of those writings wouldn’t have written some-
thing that was redundant under their understanding.  And under the late 
1700s understanding, the freedom of the press-as-technology was not 
at all redundant of the freedom of speech. 
II.  EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE FRAMING:  THE FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS COVERING AUTHORS OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS 
Any Framing-era understanding limiting the “freedom of the 
press” to the press-as-industry is especially unlikely, given the then-
existing understanding that the freedom protected books and pam-
phlets alongside newspapers. 
A.  The Non-Press-as-Industry Status of Many 
Book and Pamphlet Authors 
Books and pamphlets of that era were written largely by scientists, 
philosophers, planters, ministers, politicians, and ordinary citizens, ra-
 
66 See Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 
599-600 (1979) (so arguing); William W. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claim-
ing a “Preferred Position,” 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 769 n.16 (1977) (likewise). 
67 Cf. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 458 
(1983) (explaining that when the Court’s early First Amendment “cases were decided, 
the existence of a press clause may have been crucial”). 
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ther than by members of the institutional press.  In the words of Ben-
jamin Rush—a leading American physician and intellectual—writing 
in 1790, “Our authors and scholars are generally men of business, and 
make their literary pursuits subservient to their interests. . . . Men, 
who are philosophers or poets, without other pursuits, had better end 
their days in an old country.”68 
Some books of the era were funded by printers who were members 
of the press-as-industry.  Others were funded by authors themselves,69 by 
ideological groups,70 or by “subscribers” who supported the cost of pro-
duction by paying the printer up front for printing the book.71  Some 
books were likely published with hope of profit, and others chiefly out 
 
68 BENJAMIN RUSH, ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 190 (Philadel-
phia, Thomas & William Bradford 2d ed. 1806); see also ROLLO G. SILVER, THE AMERI-
CAN PRINTER, 1787–1825, at 97 (1967) (“Printed authors were of necessity amateurs 
with some dependable [outside] income.”). 
69 See CHARLES A. MADISON, BOOK PUBLISHING IN AMERICA 6 (1966) (“Until pub-
lishing was well developed in the early decades of the 19th century, an American au-
thor customarily brought out his books at his own [financial] risk.”); SILVER, supra note 
68, at 98 (“Often an author considered publication a sufficient reward and he risked 
his own funds to achieve it.”).  Thus, for instance, Thomas Paine self-published Com-
mon Sense (1776) and his first work, Case of the Officers of Excise (1772).  See Bill Hender-
son, Independent Publishing:  Today and Yesterday, 421 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 93, 95-96 (1975).  Jeremy Belknap’s The History of New-Hampshire (1784), one of the 
earliest works of serious history in America, was also self-published.  See JEREMY  
BELKNAP, THE HISTORY OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE, at tit. page (Philadelphia, Robert Aitken 
1784) (indicating that the book was “printed for the author”); George B. Kirsch, Jeremy  
Belknap:  Man of Letters in the Young Republic, 54 NEW ENG. Q. 33, 35-36 (1981) (describ-
ing Belknap’s efforts to self-publish his history, and noting the significance of  
Belknap’s work).  Alexander Hamilton paid more than half of the cost of the first 
printing of The Federalist in book form.  See MAIER, supra note 31, at 84.  And Tunis 
Wortman’s early work on the freedom of the press was likewise self-published.  See  
TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE, CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF 
THE PRESS, at tit. page (photo. reprint 1970) (1800).  The notation “printed for the 
author,” seen on Belknap’s and Wortman’s title pages, meant the book was published 
at the author’s expense.  Keith Maslen, Printing for the Author:  From the Bowyer Printing 
Ledgers, 1710–1775, [5 Ser. 27] THE LIBR. 302, 305 (1972). 
70 See, e.g., CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY; RELATIVE TO 
THE MANUMISSION OF NEGROES AND OTHERS HOLDEN IN BONDAGE, at tit. page (Bur-
lington, Isaac Neale 1794) (“Printed for ‘The New-Jersey Society for Promoting the 
Abolition of Slavery.’”).  
71 See, e.g., HANNAH ADAMS & HANNAH FARNHAM SAWYER LEE, A MEMOIR OF MISS 
HANNAH ADAMS 19-21 (Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832) (describing the 1791 publication 
of the second edition of Adams’s dictionary of religions as funded partly by subscrip-
tions and partly by the printer); JOEL BARLOW, THE VISION OF COLUMBUS 259-70 
(Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1787) (listing the book’s many subscribers); 1 JOHN 
TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES 113, 116, 133, 158-60 
(1972) (discussing eighteenth century subscription publishing in America). 
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of a desire to spread ideas.  But in each of these categories, people out-
side the press-as-industry wrote many of these books. 
Such authors were outside the “art or business of printing and 
publishing,” to quote the 1828 Noah Webster definition of “press” that 
most closely fits the press-as-industry model.72  They did not fit within 
the “press” in the sense of “[n]ewspapers, journals, and periodical lit-
erature collectively,” to quote the comparable definition from the Ox-
ford English Dictionary.73  They likewise would not have fit within the 
“press” as understood by the few modern decisions that adopt a press-
as-industry view of the First Amendment.74 
Such authors were akin to a modern businessman writing and dis-
tributing a book75 or funding a video program:76  they rented facilities 
and services from printers, but they were not in the printing business 
themselves.  Yet books and pamphlets, which were predominantly 
written by such authors, were routinely understood to be covered by 
the “freedom of the press,” which suggests that this liberty was under- 
stood as encompassing more than just the press-as-industry. 
To be sure, one could define such authors as part of “the press” 
on the grounds that they used the press to communicate, even if they 
didn’t own presses or make a living from presses.  But that would be 
the same as adopting the press-as-technology model.  Book authors’ 
relationship to “the press” was in essence the same as the relationship 
of the modern authors of occasional newspaper articles to the news-
paper owners, or the relationship of modern advertisers to the news-
paper owners.77  All such authors used the press-as-technology by bor-
 
72 See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 24 (under “press”).   
73 First Definition of “Press,” OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/150765. 
74 See, e.g., infra notes 318-19, 333, 380 and accompanying text; see also Matera v. 
Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971, 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting a state statutory 
privilege for members of the “media” as “intended to apply to persons who gather and 
disseminate news on an ongoing basis as part of the organized, traditional, mass media”). 
75 See infra note 380 (discussing the view of some FEC commissioners that book 
authors aren’t entitled to the “media exemption” from campaign finance law). 
76 See, e.g., Citizens United, Advisory Opinion 2004-30, at 2-3 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Sept. 10, 2004); see also infra notes 382-33.  I analogize here to a hypothetical 
individual speaker, not a corporation; to what extent the First Amendment protects 
corporate speech, whether by newspapers or by the public, is a story for another day.  
This Article focuses on the separate question of whether the “freedom . . . of the 
press” protects newspapers, magazines, and the like—whether corporations or not—
more than it protects other organizations. 
77 See, for example, People v. Judah, discussed infra subsection III.B.3. 
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rowing or renting space on printing presses from members of the 
press-as-industry. 
B.  Specific References to the Freedom of the Press 
as Covering Books and Pamphlets 
Around the Framing, books were clearly seen as covered by the 
liberty of the press.  David Hume’s The History of England, for instance, 
said this to describe the 1694 expiration of the statute that required a 
license to print: 
The liberty of the press did not even commence with the revolution [of 
1689].  It was not till 1694, that the restraints were taken off; to the great 
displeasure of the king, and his ministers, who, seeing nowhere in any 
government, during present or past ages, any example of such unlimited 
freedom, doubted much of its salutary effects, and probably thought, 
that no books or writings would ever so much improve the general un-
derstanding of men, as to render it safe to entrust them with an indul-
gence so easily abused.
78
 
Likewise, in his 1741 essay Liberty of the Press, Hume noted that “[w]e 
need not dread from [the liberty of the press] any such ill Conse-
quences as followed from the Harangues of the popular Demagogues 
of Athens and Tribunes of Rome” because a “Man reads a Book or 
Pamphlet alone and coolly” rather than surrounded by a mob that 
may inflame him.79  Similarly, in 1788, James Iredell—then a defender 
of the proposed Constitution and a soon-to-be Supreme Court Jus-
tice—spoke of the liberty of the press as including books: 
 The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for declamation, but 
the future Congress will have no other authority over this than to secure 
to authors for a limited time an exclusive privilege of publishing their 
works.—This authority has been long exercised in England, where the 
press is as free as among ourselves or in any country in the world; and 
surely such an encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty of 
the press, since men are allowed to publish what they please of their 
own, and so far as this may be deemed a restraint upon others it is cer-
tainly a reasonable one . . . . If the Congress should exercise any other 
power over the press than this, they will do it without any warrant from 
 
78 8 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 332 (London, T. Cadell 1782) 
(1754–1762); see also Lewis, supra note 66, at 597-98 (“Those who called for ‘freedom of 
the press’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had in mind books and pam-
phlets and all kinds of occasional literature as much as newspapers.”). 
79 DAVID HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL 15 (Edinburgh, R. Fleming & A. 
Allison 1761).  As to pamphlets and other short publications, see infra notes 136-37 
and accompanying text. 
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this constitution, and must answer for it as for any other act of tyranny.
80
 
Copyright law at the time covered books, maps, and charts, but not 
newspapers.81  To talk about copyright law as even potentially relat-
ed—however benignly—to the freedom of the press suggests that the 
freedom of the press was seen as applicable to books. 
Judge Alexander Addison’s 1799 grand jury charge similarly stated 
that “the freedom of the press consists in this, that any man may, 
without the consent of any other, print any book or writing whatever, 
being . . . liable to punishment, if he injure an individual or the pub-
lic.”82  A law “that no book should be printed without permission from 
a certain officer,” Addison said in the same charge, “would be a law 
abridging the liberty of the press.”83  And St. George Tucker, in 1803, 
echoed Hume in writing that the expiration of the licensing of print-
ers in 1694 “established the freedom of the press in England,” partly 
by freeing the printing and distribution of books.84 
C.  Freedom of the Press as Extending to Literary, 
Religious, and Scientific Works 
Many leading sources of that era also spoke of the liberty of the 
press as extending to literary, religious, and scientific writings, which 
were often (probably much more often than not) published by people 
who did not engage in journalism or printing for a living.  Hume’s Of 
the Liberty of the Press, for instance, discussed “the Liberty of the Press, 
by which all the Learning, Wit, and Genius of the Nation may be em-
ploy’d on the side of [freedom] and everyone be animated to its De-
fence.”85  The Continental Congress’s 1774 Letter to the Inhabitants of 
Quebec discussed the importance of the freedom of the press as con-
 
80 JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON’S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITU-
TION RECOMMENDED BY THE LATE CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, reprinted in 2 LIFE 
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 186, 207-08 (Griffith J. McRee ed., New York, 
D. Appleton & Co. 1858). 
81 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (repealed 1802); see 
also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (Thompson, Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1829) (No. 2872) (“We are . . . of opinion that [a newspaper] is not a book, the copy-
right to which can be secured under the act of congress.”).  Copyright law didn’t pro-
tect newspapers until 1909.  See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:60, at 3-
172 n.2 (2010). 
82 ALEXANDER ADDISON, CHARGES TO GRAND JURIES OF THE COUNTIES OF THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT, IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 279 (Washington, John Colerick 1800). 
83 Id. at 282.  
84 1 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 298. 
85 HUME, supra note 79, at 14. 
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sisting in part of “the advancement of truth, science, morality, and 
arts,” as well as of politics.86  Nor was this an original view at the time; 
the French philosopher Helvetius, who was well known to the Framing 
generation,87 similarly wrote that “[i]t is to contradiction, and conse-
quently to the liberty of the press, that physics owes its improvements.  
Had this liberty never subsisted, how many errors, consecrated by 
time, would be cited as incontestible axioms!  What is here said of 
physics is applicable to morality and politics.”88 
Justice Iredell expressed the same view in a 1799 grand jury 
charge:  “The liberty of the press . . . has converted barbarous nations 
into civilized ones—taught science to rear its head—enlarged the ca-
pacity—increased the comforts of private life—and, leading the ban-
ners of freedom, has extended her sway where her very name was un-
known.”89  Likewise, James Madison’s 1799 Address of the General 
Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia stated—in the mid-
dle of the discussion of the “liberty . . . of the press”—that “it is to the 
press mankind are indebted for having dispelled the clouds which 
long encompassed religion, for disclosing her genuine lustre, and dis-
seminating her salutary doctrines.”90 
Yet science, religion, morality, the arts, and civilization were most-
ly advanced by works written by people who were scientists, theologi-
ans, philosophers, or artists, not journalists or printers.  It seems hard 
to imagine that Hume, Iredell, Madison, and the Continental Con-
gress were speaking about a freedom of the press that extended only 
to newspapermen and excluded the Newtons, Luthers, Humes, Lock-
es, Jeffersons, and Madisons of the world. 
 
86 Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Providence 
of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, 
at 105, 108 (1904). 
87 See, e.g., A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT [MERCY OTIS WARREN], OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS 2 (Boston, n. 
pub. 1788) (quoting Helvetius); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel William 
Duane (Sept. 16, 1810) (same), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 538, 539 
(H.A. Washington ed., Washington, Taylor & Maury 1853).  
88 2 HELVETIUS, A TREATISE ON MAN, HIS INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES AND HIS EDU-
CATION 319 (W. Hooper ed. & trans., London, B. Law & G. Robinson 1777) (translat-
ing 2 HELVETIUS, DE L’HOMME, DE SES FACULTÉS INTELLECTUELLES, ET DE SON ÉDUCA-
TION (London, La Société Typographique 1773)). 
89 In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 838 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5124). 
90 James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia ( Jan. 23, 1799), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 509, 511 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865). 
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III.  EVIDENCE FROM THE FRAMING AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 
CASES FROM 1784 TO 1840 
Fifteen early cases also show that courts and lawyers during the early 
years of the Republic understood the freedom of the press as extending 
to authors regardless of whether they were members of the press-as-
industry.  Though the American cases follow the drafting of the First 
Amendment by one to five decades, they are entirely consistent with the 
1700s evidence discussed above.  I have seen no reason to think there 
was some change from a press-as-industry understanding in the 1700s to 
a press-as-technology understanding as shown in those cases. 
If anything, the common definition of “press” was more clearly fo-
cused on the press-as-technology in the late 1700s than it was in the 
1820s and 1830s.  The only possibly relevant definition of “press” in 
Samuel Johnson’s 1755–1756 dictionary referred just to the printing 
press;91 the same was true of the 1790 edition92 and of Noah Webster’s 
1806 A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, published in 
America.93  Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, on the other hand, in-
cluded both the technology and the industry as possible meanings of 
 
91 See 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. 
Strahan 2d ed. 1756) (defining “press” as “[t]he instrument by which books are print-
ed”).  Johnson’s was “for well over a century . . . without peer as the most authoritative 
dictionary in English.”  SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES:  THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEX-
ICOGRAPHY 56 (1984). 
92 See 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. 
& C. Rivington et al. 9th ed. 1790) (defining “press” as “[t]he instrument by which 
books are printed”). 
93 See NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
235 (Hartford, Sidney’s Press 1806) (defining “press” as an “instrument used for print-
ing”).  The first American dictionary is short and has no entry for “press” or “liberty of 
the press.”  See SAMUEL JOHNSON, JR., A SCHOOL DICTIONARY 114, 142 (New Haven, 
Edward O’Brien n.d.) (the author is not the more famous Samuel Johnson).  Neither 
do two of the leading English law dictionaries of the era. See 2 RICHARD BURN, A NEW 
LAW DICTIONARY (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792); 2 TIMOTHY CUNNING-
HAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (London, J.F. & C. Rivington 3d ed. 
1783).  A third major law dictionary lists “press, (Liberty of the),” but simply cites back to 
Blackstone, and adds the passage, “The printers of the public papers, should for ever 
recollect the motto libertas sine licentia, or they, who doubtless wish well to that  
principal bulwark of our constitution, may, tho’ without design, ultimately prove its 
greatest enemies.”  GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 3 (London, W. Strahan & W. 
Woodfall 10th ed. 1782).  The instruction to “printers of the public papers” suggests 
that their misbehavior was seen as a serious threat to the liberty of the press; but it does 
not assert that the liberty belonged only to such printers, especially given Blackstone’s 
discussion of this as a liberty of “every freeman.”  The first American law dictionary 
does not define “press,” but defines “liberty of the press” without shedding light on the 
question before us.  JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 42 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. 
Johnson 1839). 
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“press” (though the dictionary specifically defined the “liberty of the 
press” as a right of “every citizen” and as including the right to publish 
“books” and “pamphlets”).94  Likewise, the Oxford English Dictionary re-
ports that the press-as-industry definition was just developing in the 
late 1700s and early 1800s, giving this as definition 3(d) of “press”: 
Newspapers, journals, and periodical literature collectively. . . . This use 
of the word appears to have originated in phrases such as the liberty of the 
press, to write for the press, to silence the press, etc., in which ‘press’ originally 
had sense 3c [The printing-press in operation, the work or function of 
the press; the art or practice of printing], but was gradually taken to 
mean the products of the printing press. Quotations before 1820 reflect 
the transition between these senses.95 
Yet despite that development, the 1820s and 1830s cases continued to 
treat the “freedom of the press” as being everyone’s freedom to use 
the technology.  If judges used such a meaning in the 1820s and 
1830s, it would have been even more certainly used in 1791, when the 
alternative meaning of “press” to refer to the industry was just begin-
ning to emerge. 
A.  Discussions of the Freedom of the Press as Protecting 
Non-Press-as-Industry Writers (England) 
Twelve of the fifteen cases I discuss involve “freedom of the press” 
or “liberty of the press” being expressly discussed with regard to the 
rights of people who were not members of the press-as-industry.  The-
se were not printers, newspaper publishers, or editors, but rather 
people who wrote books, pamphlets, newspaper ads, or letters and 
other submissions to the editor. 
Sometimes the authors won and sometimes they lost:  the freedom 
of the press, even when it was implicated, was often not seen as provid-
ing particularly broad protection.  But in all these cases, the lawyers 
and the judges were willing to discuss the non-press-as-industry de-
fendants’ rights under the freedom of the press.  And there is no rec-
ord of anyone arguing that the defendants lacked such rights because 
they were not members of the press-as-industry. 
 
94 WEBSTER, supra note 24 (under “press”).  The main rival of Webster’s dictionary 
contained shorter entries and included “an instrument for . . . printing” as the only 
relevant definition of “press.”  JOSEPH EMERSON WORCESTER, A COMPREHENSIVE PRO-
NOUNCING AND EXPLANATORY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 243 (Boston, 
Hillard et al. 1830); see also LANDAU, supra note 91, at 56 (listing Worcester as Web-
ster’s chief American rival). 
95 First Definition of “Press,” supra note 73. 
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Of these twelve cases, three are English, but I include them be-
cause American judges and lawyers understood them as being relevant 
to American constitutional law—both as evidence of the English “lib-
erty of the press” as inherited by Americans at the Framing, and as in-
fluences on post-Framing American legal developments.  Justice Sto-
ry’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, to give just one 
example, refers to only five cases in the “liberty of the press” section, 
and two of them are English (the Dean of St. Asaph’s Case and Burdett, 
both discussed below).96 
The American freedom of the press was often seen as broader 
than the English common law definition,97 but I haven’t seen sources 
suggesting that it was seen as narrower.  And, as the discussion below 
shows, the English cases are entirely consistent with the American cas-
es on the question that we are discussing. 
1.  Rex v. Shipley (Dean of St. Asaph’s Case) (1784) 
William Shipley, a minister who held the position of Dean of St. 
Asaph Cathedral, was prosecuted in 1784 for seditious libel for re-
printing a pamphlet.98  (The pamphlet itself was also written by some-
one who was not a journalist or printer, William Jones, a lawyer and 
judge.)99  Thomas Erskine defended Shipley, arguing that the liberty 
of the press meant the jury had to determine whether the pamphlet 
was indeed libelous100—an argument that assumed the liberty covered 
Shipley, who was not a member of the press-as-industry. 
Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Shipley rejected Erskine’s argument, 
and followed the then-orthodox English rule that the judge would de-
cide whether the publication was libelous.101  But Mansfield did not 
suggest that the liberty of the press was limited to members of the 
press-as-industry, which would have categorically excluded Shipley.  
 
96 3 STORY, supra note 24, §§ 1879–1883, at 737 & nn.1 & 3, 742 n.1. 
97 See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 47, at 569-70 (“Th[e constitutional] security of the 
freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt, not only from previous re-
straint of the executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also . . . .”). 
98 R v. Shipley (The Dean of St. Asaph’s Case), (1784) 21 How. St. Tr. 847 (K.B.) 
847-58. 
99 Id. at 876-77. 
100 Id. at 900, 903, 924, 1005, 1023.  This was the same argument made by Andrew 
Hamilton on behalf of John Peter Zenger in 1735 in New York.  R v. Zenger (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1735) (statement of defense counsel Andrew Hamilton), reprinted in JOHN PETER 
ZENGER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER 
OF THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 29-30 (Boston, Thomas Fleet 1738). 
101 21 How. St. Tr. at 1035, 1040. 
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Rather, Mansfield wrote (echoing Blackstone) that “[t]he liberty of 
the press consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to 
the consequences of law.”102  Under this view, all publications—
including those by non-press-as-industry authors such as Shipley—
were protected only from prior restraints, and all could be punished 
by the law of seditious libel. 
And Erskine’s defense was known and approved of in America.  
Both the case and Erskine’s arguments were cited extensively in People 
v. Croswell, the leading 1804 New York case that dealt with whether 
truth was a defense in libel cases.103  Erskine’s position was quoted by 
the defense in the 1806 case United States v. Smith;104  though the refer-
ence was to the role of the jury generally, and not to free speech in 
particular, the detailed quotation of Erskine’s speech to the jury sug-
gests that the speech was known and respected in early America.   
Later, Justice Story mentioned the “celebrated defense of Mr. Erskine, 
on the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph” in the freedom of the press sec-
tion of his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution.105 
The quotations gave no hint that Erskine’s use of the liberty of the 
press to defend a churchman rather than a newspaperman was at all 
questionable.  Rather, they seem consistent with the American under-
standing of the right’s being a right of “every citizen.” 
2.  Rex v. Rowan (1794) 
Archibald Hamilton Rowan was an Irish radical politician and one 
of the leaders of the Society of United Irishmen.  The Society pub-
lished a 1500-word broadside, titled “An Address to the Volunteers of 
 
102 Id. at 1040. 
103 See 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 341, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (2-2 decision) (noting that 
the trial court cited Shipley to the jury and the prosecution relied on it in defending the 
judgment on appeal); id. at 371-72 (opinion of Kent, J.) (discussing Shipley); id. at 405, 
408 (opinion of Lewis, C.J.) (citing Erskine’s arguments).  A 1797 U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral opinion likewise quoted Shipley, though focusing only on Lord Mansfield’s  
opinion.  Libellous Publ’ns, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 71, 72 (1797). 
104 United States v. Smith (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806), reprinted in THOMAS LLOYD, THE TRI-
ALS OF WILLIAM S. SMITH, AND SAMUEL G. OGDEN, FOR MISDEMEANOURS 177 (New 
York, I. Riley & Co. 1807). 
105 3 STORY, supra note 24, § 1879, at 737 n.3; see also BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE 
RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 325 (Boston, Marsh, Capen & Lyon 1832) (noting 
that Erskine’s “argument on the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph . . . is now the settled law 
of the land” in both the United States and England). 
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Ireland”; Rowan distributed it, which led to his being prosecuted for 
seditious libel.106 
Rowan was a politician, not an editor or a printer.107  Nonetheless, 
both the prosecutors and the defense counsel, John Philpot Curran, 
told the jury that the case touched on the “freedom of the press” or 
the “liberty of the press”;108 their disagreement was about whether Ro-
wan’s actions were an abuse of the freedom, and thus punishable.109  
As in Shipley, the liberty of the press was apparently seen as applying to 
all, not just to members of the press-as-industry. 
Rowan’s case was well publicized in America.  A full-length report 
of the trial was reprinted in New York,110 and advertised both there 
and in Baltimore.111  The trial was discussed in newspapers,112 as was 
Rowan’s imprisonment and escape.113  Shortly after his escape, Rowan 
fled to America,114 where he received some attention from fellow 
 
106 R v. Rowan, (1794) 22 How. St. Tr. 1033 (K.B.) 1034-37. 
107 See, e.g., ARCHIBALD HAMILTON ROWAN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 147 (Dublin, Thomas 
Tegg & Co. 1840) (discussing Rowan’s entry into Irish politics). 
108 See Rowan, 22 How. St. Tr. at 1069, 1087-88 (statement of defense counsel); id. 
at 1105-06 (statement of prosecutor); id. at 1157 (statement of Solicitor General). 
109 Id. at 1069-70 (statement of defense counsel). 
110 See REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF ARCHIBALD HAMILTON ROWAN, ESQ. (New York, 
Thiebout & O’Brien 1794) (1794).  The Dublin printing is labeled “printed for Archi-
bald Hamilton Rowan,” which reflects the fact that Rowan was not the printer, but just 
a politician who paid a printer to have the report printed.  REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF 
ARCHIBALD HAMILTON ROWAN, ESQ., at tit. page (Dublin, Archibald Hamilton Rowan 
1794); see also supra note 69 (discussing the meaning of notations that a book was pub-
lished for the author). 
111 See Advertisement, N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, May 31, 1794, at 3; Advertisement,  
DIARY (New York), June 18, 1794, at 3 (same); Advertisement, BALT. DAILY INTELLI-
GENCER, June 30, 1794, at 3.  
112 See Miscellany:  Sketch of the Trial of Arch. Hamilton Rowan, Esq., THE MERCURY 
(Boston), May 30, 1794, at 1 (describing the trial); Sketch of the Trial of Arch. Hamilton 
Rowan, Esq., N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, May 19, 1794, supp. 1 (reporting, among other 
things, the defense lawyer’s speech that discussed the freedom of the press); see also 
John B. Duckett, An Oration on the Liberty of the Press, FED. INTELLIGENCER & BALT. DAILY 
GAZETTE, Dec. 6, 1794, at 2 (mentioning Rowan’s case as an example of the “insatiable 
cruelty” of judges who fail to properly protect the liberty of the press). 
113 See War Expences of Prussia, DUNLAP & CLAYPOOLE’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER 
(Philadelphia), June 2, 1794, at 3 (condemning the alleged conditions of Rowan’s con-
finement); see also A Proclamation, AM. MINERVA (New York), July 2, 1794, at 2 (report-
ing on the reward offered by British authorities for information leading to Rowan’s 
recapture); Particulars of the Escape of Archibald Hamilton Rowan, GAZETTE U.S. (Phila-
delphia), July 5, 1794, at 2 (reporting on Rowan’s escape). 
114 See ROWAN, supra note 107, at 280 (describing Rowan’s arrival in Philadelphia). 
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democrats115 and became an acquaintance of Thomas Jefferson.116  
The case was remembered in later years as well:  Curran’s speech in 
Rowan’s defense, which included discussion of the liberty of the press, 
was reprinted in America in separate collections, in 1805, 1807, and 
1811,117 and the Rowan trial was mentioned by prosecutor William 
Wirt in Aaron Burr’s 1808 trial for treason.118 
3.  Rex v. Burdett (1820) 
Rex v. Burdett 119 stemmed from a letter to the editor120 written by 
Sir Francis Burdett, a nobleman and reformist politician rather than a 
printer or journalist.  Though Burdett was not a member of the press-
as-industry, the presiding judge referred to the “liberty of the press” 
four times in his opinion,121 and twice in his instructions to the jury.122  
The judge’s opinion also stressed that “the liberty of the press” means 
that “every man ought to be permitted to instruct his fellow subjects.”123  
The prosecutor mentioned the “liberty of the press” as well.124 
Burdett was well-known in America.  It was cited as to “liberty of the 
press” in Chancellor Kent’s 1827 Commentaries on American Law125 and 
 
115 See PETER PORCUPINE [WILLIAM COBBETT], THE DEMOCRATIC JUDGE:  OR THE 
EQUAL LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 78 (Philadelphia, William Cobbett 1798) (detailing Ro-
wan’s warm welcome with “many cheers”). 
116 See 2 GEORGE TUCKER, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 39 (London, Charles 
Knight & Co. 1837) (summarizing the communication between Rowan and Jefferson); 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.H. Rowan (Sept. 26, 1798) (offering support to 
Rowan and outlining rights available in the United States), in 3 MEMOIRS, CORRE-
SPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 408-09. 
117 See FORENSIC ELOQUENCE:  SKETCHES OF TRIALS IN IRELAND FOR HIGH TREA-
SON, ETC. 1 (Baltimore, G. Douglas 2d ed. 1805); 3 NATHANIEL CHAPMAN, SELECT 
SPEECHES, FORENSICK AND PARLIAMENTARY 153-93 (Philadelphia, B.B. Hopkins, & Co. 
1807); 1 SPEECHES OF JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, ESQ. 64-104 (New York, I. Riley 1811). 
118 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 402 
(Philadelphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808). 
119 R v. Burdett, (1820) 106 Eng. Rep. 873 (K.B.); 4 B. & Ald. 95. 
120 See FAIRBURN’S EDITION OF THE TRIAL OF SIR F. BURDETT, ON A CHARGE OF A 
SEDITIOUS LIBEL AGAINST HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT 2-3, 10-11 (London, John 
Fairburn 1820). 
121 Burdett, 106 Eng. Rep. at 887-88; 4 B. & Ald. at 132.  As in some of the other 
cases discussed in this Section, the judge concluded that the liberty of the press was 
limited and extended only to statements made “with temper and moderation” rather 
than “vituperation.”  Id. at 888; 4 B. & Ald. at 133. 
122 FAIRBURN’S EDITION OF THE TRIAL OF SIR F. BURDETT, supra note 120, at 37-38. 
123 Burdett, 106 Eng. Rep. at 887; 4 B. & Ald. at 132 (emphasis added). 
124 FAIRBURN’S EDITION OF THE TRIAL OF SIR F. BURDETT, supra note 120, at 9. 
125 2 KENT, supra note 28, at 15. 
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in Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution,126 as to venue in 
libel cases in Commonwealth v. Blanding (1825),127 and in a general note 
on libel law following People v. Simons (1823).128 
B.   Discussions of the Freedom of the Press as Protecting 
Non-Press-as-Industry Writers (America) 
1.  United States v. Cooper (1800) 
One of the leading cases under the Sedition Act of 1798 involved 
the prosecution of Thomas Cooper for publishing a one-page hand-
bill criticizing President Adams.129  At the time of the trial, Cooper was 
not a member of the institutional press.  He had edited the Northum-
berland Gazette for two months, but that task had ended four months 
before the leaflet was distributed.130 Moreover, the leaflet that led to 
his prosecution was unrelated to his past editorial tasks.131 
Yet the trial was seen as implicating the freedom of the press.  In 
response to the argument that his leaflet diminished the confidence 
of the people in the government, Cooper argued to the jury that this 
confidence should be earned, and not “exacted by the guarded provi-
sions of Sedition Laws, by attacks on the Freedom of the Press, by 
prosecutions, pains, and penalties on those which boldly express the 
truth.”132  He went on to say that “in the present state of affairs, the 
press is open to those who will praise, while the threats of the Law 
hang over those who blame the conduct of the men in power.”133  Lat-
 
126 3 STORY, supra note 24, §§ 1878–1879, at 737 nn.1 & 3. 
127 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 311 (1825); see also Commonwealth v. Child, 30 Mass. 
(13 Pick.) 198, 200 (1832) (noting that the Attorney General cited Burdett). 
128 1 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 339, 359 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1823). 
129 See Eugene Volokh, Thomas Cooper, Early American Public Intellectual, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 372, 376-77 (2009) (describing Cooper’s libel prosecution). 
130 DUMAS MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER 1783–1839, at 91, 105 
(1926); see also THOMAS COOPER, POLITICAL ESSAYS, at preface, 4, 31-32 (Northumber-
land, Andrew Kennedy 1799) (corroborating the dates in Malone’s report). 
131 For a modern perspective on this, see, for example, FEC v. Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1986), which held that even an organization 
that publishes a regular newsletter isn’t entitled to the election law “press exemption” 
for a different publication that the organization distributes through other channels.  
See also Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 781 (Mo. 1985) (holding that even a 
newsletter publisher should be treated as a nonmedia defendant when he sends an ar-
ticle to specific people, rather than just publishing it in his regular newsletter). 
132 United States v. Cooper (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1800), reprinted in 
THOMAS COOPER, AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF THOMAS COOPER OF NORTHUMBER-
LAND 19 (Philadelphia, John Bioren 1800). 
133 Id. 
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er, complaining about the court’s requiring him to produce certain 
original documents to support his defense, he argued that such re-
quirements “would be an engine of oppression of itself sufficiently 
powerful to establish a perfect despotism over the press.”134 
And Justice Samuel Chase’s charge to the jury seems to support the 
notion that the prosecution involved “the press,” which in context must 
have meant use of the press-as-technology and not the press-as-industry.  
Seditious libel prosecutions, Chase argued, were proper because 
[a] republican government can only be destroyed in two ways; the intro-
duction of luxury, or the licentiousness of the press.  This latter is the 
more slow but most sure and certain means of bringing about the de-
struction of the government.  The legislature of this country knowing 
this maxim, has thought proper to pass a law to check this licentiousness 
of the press—by a clause in that law it is enacted (reads the second sec-
tion of the sedition law).
135
 
Others also characterized Cooper’s prosecution as involving “the 
freedom of the press.”  John Thomson echoed Cooper’s assertions 
that his prosecution violated the freedom of the press in An Enquiry, 
Concerning the Liberty, and Licentiousness of the Press: 
What was James Thomson Callender pros[e]cuted for at Richmond?  For 
publishing his opinions through the medium of the Press.  What was 
Charles Holt, the Editor of the New London Bee, prosecuted for?  Be-
cause he published the opinions of another person.  What was Thomas 
Cooper prosecuted for?  For publishing his opinions through the same 
mode of communication:—viz. the Press. . . . [T]he Constitution has 
been violated, both by the Sedition law under which they were convicted, 
and by the prosecutions themselves.
136
 
And the following year, John Wood’s History of the Administration of 
John Adams likewise stated, 
The prosecutions of Lyon and Callender, of Cooper and Holt, are the 
best commentary upon the Sedition law.  The names of these gentlemen 
will be quoted in support of the liberty of the press, and of the tyranny of 
 
134 Id. at 35.  This difficulty was peculiar to this trial, rather than to all Sedition Act 
prosecutions; Cooper thus wasn’t complaining about what the Sedition Act did in oth-
er prosecutions (which indeed mostly targeted press-as-industry speakers), but rather 
was asserting his own rights as a user of “the press.” 
135 Id. at 42-43. 
136 JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS 
OF THE PRESS, AND THE UNCONTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 25 (New 
York, Johnson & Stryker 1801). 
VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  5:47 PM 
2012] Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology? 491 
Mr. Adams, when the labored arguments of Paterson and Peters, of Ire-
dell, Addison and Chase, are no longer remembered.
137
 
Thompson and Wood discussed Cooper, who had a leaflet printed 
for him, the same way they discussed Lyon, Callender, and Holt, who 
published their libels in the newspapers they edited. 
2.  Impeachment of Justice Chase (1805) 
Five years later, Justice Chase found himself as a defendant in an 
impeachment proceeding.  The House prosecution argued that Jus-
tice Chase had misbehaved in criticizing the administration from the 
bench.138 
In the course of the trial, one of the managers of the prosecution, 
Congressman John Randolph—the leader of the House Democratic-
Republicans139—noted that his only objection was to “the prostitution 
of the bench of justice to the purposes of an hustings” and “de-
claim[ing] on [political topics] from his seat of office.” 140  Randolph 
stressed that he was not objecting to any extrajudicial publications 
that Chase might produce:  “Let him speak and write and publish as 
he pleases.  This is his right in common with his fellow citizens.  The 
press is free.”  Thus, Chase—not a member of the press-as-industry—
was seen as being free to, “in common with his fellow citizens,” “pub-
lish as he pleases” using the “free” “press.”141 
Unlike in the other cases in this subsection, the only statement 
about the “press” in this case came from an advocate, not from a 
judge.  But Randolph had little to gain by using a controversial defini-
tion of “free” “press,” or by trying to broaden the liberty of the press 
beyond its established boundaries.  Indeed, he had something to lose, 
since using a controversial definition would have made his argument 
less persuasive.  His willingness as an advocate to refer to Chase as hav-
ing the right to use the “free” “press” suggests that he knew his audi-
ence would accept the argument. 
 
137 JOHN WOOD, THE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS, ESQ. 221 
(New York, n. pub. 1802). 
138 See 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 123 (Washington, Samuel H. Smith 1805). 
139 See HENRY ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 55 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin 
& Co. 1898) (describing the close working relationship between President Jefferson 
and John Randolph). 
140 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, supra note 138, at 123. 
141 Id. 
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3.  People v. Judah (1823) 
In People v. Judah,142 Samuel Judah, the apparently nineteen-year-
old author of a self-published,143 book-length poem called Gotham and 
the Gothamites, was prosecuted for libeling various noted New Yorkers 
in the poem.144  Though the defendant had written and published 
some plays,145 the category “playwright” would likely not have been 
considered part of the press-as-industry.  Playwrights of the era chiefly 
wrote as a sideline to their normal occupations146 and published as a 
sideline to trying to get their plays staged.147  Nor is it likely that Go-
tham and the Gothamites itself, a self-published poem mocking local no-
tables, would have been a viable commercial venture for the author.  
Moreover, even if Judah had been seen as a professional book author, 
it’s not clear that this would have made him a member of  the press-as-
industry.148 
Yet the court thought it necessary to instruct the jury about the 
liberty of the press, though stressing that such liberty was limited to 
examining the character of candidates for public office and did not 
 
142 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 26 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. Ct. 1823). 
143 See SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, GOTHAM AND THE GOTHAMITES, at tit. page (New York, 
S. King 1823) (indicating that the book was “published for the author”); supra note 69 
(discussing the meaning of “published for the author”). 
144 I say “apparently” because defense counsel asserted that Judah was nineteen, 2 
Wheel. Cr. Cas. at 32, and the court said that Judah was “under age,” id. at 41, which 
suggests that the court was accepting defense counsel’s assertion.  There is some un-
certainty, though, about whether Judah was nineteen or twenty-four.  See 1 JACOB RAD-
ER MARCUS, UNITED STATES JEWRY:  1776–1985, at 460 (1989). 
145 See, e.g., SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, THE MOUNTAIN TORRENT (New York, Thomas 
Longworth 1820); SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, ODOFRIEDE (New York, Wiley & Halsted 1822); 
SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, THE ROSE OF ARRAGON (New York, S. King 2d ed. 1822); SAMUEL 
B.H. JUDAH, A TALE OF LEXINGTON (New York, Dramatic Repository 1823). 
146 See Gary A. Richardson, Plays and Playwrights:  1800–1865 (“[P]laywriting as a 
profession arguably did not exist in early nineteenth-century America.”), in 1 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN THEATRE 250, 251-52 (Don B. Wilmeth & Christo-
pher Bigsby eds., 1998). 
147 See ARTHUR HOBSON QUINN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN DRAMA:  FROM THE 
BEGINNING TO THE CIVIL WAR 161 (2d ed. 1943) (reporting that playwrights made little 
money from their plays, and what money they made generally came not from publish-
ing but from the proceeds of special third-night performances designated for their  
benefit); Richardson, supra note 146, at 254 (concluding that printing one’s play 
wasn’t likely to make money, because then-existing copyright law wouldn’t block rival 
productions of a play and theater managers could therefore stage a published play 
without compensating the playwright).  
148 The few modern cases that take a press-as-industry view of the freedom of the 
press, and that consider whether book authors qualify as members of the press-as-
industry, conclude that they do not so qualify.  See cases cited supra note 74. 
VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  5:47 PM 
2012] Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology? 493 
include “invad[ing] the sanctity of private repose.”149  Likewise, when 
pronouncing sentence, the court again mentioned the liberty of the 
press, but reasoned that the punishment imposed on Judah did not 
violate the liberty because his libels were an abuse of the liberty.150 
4.  People v. Simons, Commonwealth v. Blanding, In re Austin, 
Commonwealth v. Thomson, and Taylor v. Delavan 
These five cases all involved materials submitted to newspapers—as 
a paid ad, as a letter to the editor, or as a similar submission—by people 
who were not publishers, editors, or employees of the newspaper. 
a.  People v. Simons (1823) 
People v. Simons involved a newspaper advertisement bought by de-
fendants, businessmen who accused two other businessmen of being 
insolvent.151  Defendants were prosecuted for criminal libel, and ap-
pealed to the liberty of the press secured by the New York Constitu-
tion’s Bill of Rights.152  The prosecution acknowledged the applicabil-
ity of the constitutional provision, but argued that the provision was 
limited to “publication . . . made with good motives, and for justifiable 
ends.”153  The court instructed the jury about the constitutional provi-
sion, echoing the prosecution’s point.154  The jury acquitted.155 
The reporter’s note following Simons was consistent with the 
court’s implicit assumption that businessmen buying an advertisement 
were protected by the “liberty of the press.”  “In this country,” the 
note said, “every man may publish temperate investigations of the na-
ture and forms of government.”156  “It has always been a favourite privi-
lege of the American citizen” (a “right . . . guaranteed to us by the con-
stitution”) “to investigate the tendency of public measures, and the 
character and conduct of public men.”157 
 
149 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. at 34. 
150 Id. at 36. 
151 People v. Simons, 1 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 339, 340 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1823). 
152 Id. at 349. 
153 Id. at 350. 
154 Id. at 353. 
155 Id. at 354. 
156 Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
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b.  Commonwealth v. Blanding (1825) 
In Commonwealth v. Blanding, James Blanding—a farmer and the 
city clerk158—was convicted of libeling someone by submitting an item 
for publication in a newspaper.159  The appellate court rejected 
Blanding’s freedom of the press argument, but only because it con-
cluded that libels weren’t covered by the freedom of the press, and 
because the freedom of the press was only a freedom from prior re-
straint:  “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who 
used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the right to keep 
fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance 
or destruction.”160 
c.  In re Austin (1835) 
The court in In re Austin reversed the disbarment of several law-
yers who had submitted to a newspaper an open letter urging a judge 
to resign.161  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a lawyer 
may be disciplined for “scrutiny into the official conduct of the judg-
es”162 only when such scrutiny was libelous, which at the time was seen 
as turning on the author’s motive.163  And “when thus limited” to libel, 
the court concluded, the possibility of “professional responsibility for 
libel” does not “impinge on the liberty of the press,”164 precisely be-
cause everyone, lawyer or not, could be legally punished for libel.  The 
non-press-as-industry lawyer authors in this case were thus seen as po-
tentially protected by “the liberty of the press” on precisely the same 
terms as others were. 
 
158 See 3 REPRESENTATIVE MEN AND OLD FAMILIES OF SOUTHEASTERN MASSACHU-
SETTS 1314-15 (1912). 
159 See 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 304 (1825). 
160 Id. at 314.  
161 In re Austin, 5 Rawle 191, 208 (Pa. 1835). 
162 Id. at 205. 
163 Compare id. (“It is the motive therefore that makes an invasion of the judge’s 
rights a breach of professional fidelity . . . .”), with Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 
270 (Pa. 1805) (holding, in a newspaper case, that “[t]he liberty of the press consists in 
publishing the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends” (quoting New York v. 
Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (statement of defense counsel Al-
exander Hamilton))). 
164 In re Austin, 5 Rawle at 205. 
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d.  Commonwealth v. Thomson (1839) 
In Commonwealth v. Thomson, Thomson—an herbalist who claimed 
to have invented a new system for treating diseases—placed an adver-
tisement in a newspaper denouncing as an impostor another doctor 
who was claiming to practice the same system.165  Thomson was prose-
cuted for libel, and his lawyers argued that he was protected by the 
liberty of the press.166  The judge’s instructions to the jury mentioned 
the liberty of the press, but stated that libel law did not violate that 
liberty.167  The jury convicted.168 
e.  Taylor v. Delavan (1840) 
The defendant in Taylor v. Delavan was a temperance activist who 
submitted an item for publication in a newspaper,169 alleging that a lo-
cal brewer was using dirty water to brew his beer. The brewer sued for 
libel.  The judge’s instructions to the jury noted that the law “affords 
to every citizen the free use of the press to publish for the information 
or protection of the public,” but also “restrains this liberty by requir-
ing an adherence to truth.”170  The jury acquitted.171 
5.  Brandreth v. Lance (1839) 
Brandreth v. Lance172 was the first American court decision to strike 
down an injunction as an unconstitutional interference with the free-
dom of the press.  Lance was a business rival of Brandreth, who com-
missioned a man named Trust to write an allegedly libelous biography 
of Brandreth and then contracted with a printer named Hodges to 
publish it.  Brandreth asked for, and got, an injunction barring busi-
 
165 See Commonwealth v. Thomson (Boston Mun. Ct. 1839), reprinted in REPORT OF 
THE TRIAL OF DR. SAMUEL THOMSON 3-5 (Boston, Henry P. Lewis 1839).  In the 1830s, 
two publications, the Thomsonian Recorder and the Thomsonian Manual, publicized 
Thomson’s theories and were at various times endorsed by Thomson; but neither was 
edited or published by Thomson.  See JOHN S. HALLER JR., THE PEOPLE’S DOCTORS:  
SAMUEL THOMSON AND THE AMERICAN BOTANICAL MOVEMENT, 1790–1860, at 107-10, 
215 (2000).  In any event, neither publication is mentioned in the case. 
166 Thomson, supra note 165, at 40-41. 
167 Id. at 46. 
168 Id. at 48. 
169 Taylor v. Delavan (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1840), reprinted in A REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF 
THE CAUSE OF JOHN TAYLOR VS. EDWARD C. DELAVAN, PROSECUTED FOR AN ALLEGED 
LIBEL 6-7 (Albany, Hoffman, White & Visscher 1840). 
170 Id. at 45. 
171 Id. at 48. 
172 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch. 1839). 
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nessman Lance, writer Trust, and printer Hodges from publishing the 
biography.173  The New York Chancery Court reversed, holding that 
the injunction violated the liberty of the press.174  Nothing in the 
court’s opinion suggested that the liberty of the press was a right that 
belonged only to printer Hodges; the injunction was dissolved as to all 
defendants, including Trust and Lance.175 
6.  Summary 
All these cases suggest that the “freedom of the press” was seen as 
applicable not just to newspapermen, but also to ministers, politicians, 
businessmen, physicians, and others.  One or another of the cases 
might be seen as an anomaly (for instance, because a particular de-
fendant might have been viewed by the court as being closely enough 
linked to the press).  But put together, these cases suggest that the 
press-as-technology model was widely accepted, and that there was 
nothing controversial about discussing the freedom of the press as be-
longing to people who weren’t members of the press-as-industry. 
C.  Cases Involving Newspaper Defendants 
Three more cases involved newspaper editors as defendants, but 
in a context that shed light on the broader definition of the freedom 
of the press. 
1.  Commonwealth v. Buckingham (1822) 
Commonwealth v. Buckingham concluded that the liberty of the 
press secured to a defendant the right to introduce the truth of the 
statement as evidence that he published with a good motive, and 
therefore the accused wouldn’t be guilty of libel.176  In the process, the 
judge discussed what “the press” meant: 
What is the press? 
 It is an instrument; an instrument of great moral and intellectual ef-
ficacy. 
 The liberty of the press, therefore, is nothing more than the liberty of 
 
173 Id. at 24-25. 
174 Id. at 27. 
175 Id. at 28. 
176 Commonwealth v. Buckingham (Boston Mun. Ct. 1822), reprinted in TRIAL:  
COMMONWEALTH VS. J.T. BUCKINGHAM, ON AN INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL 13 (Boston, J.T. 
Buckingham 4th ed. 1830). 
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a moral and intellectual being, (that is, of a moral agent) to use that par-
ticular instrument. 
. . . . 
 If A. thrust B. through with a sword, and he dies, A. has used an in-
strument over which he had power; whether in that he was guilty of an 
act of licentiousness, for which he is obnoxious to punishment, or mere-
ly exercised an authorized liberty, for which he shall go free, depends 
not upon the fact, or the effect, but upon the motive and end, which in-
duced the thrust. 
. . . . 
 . . . [I]f the liberty to use the press depended, like the liberty to use 
every other instrument, upon the quality of the motive and the end . . . 
then the right to give the truth in evidence would follow necessarily and 
of course. 
. . . . 
 Is there any thing in the nature of the instrument, called the press, 
which makes the liberty of a moral agent to use it, different from his lib-
erty to use any other instrument? 
. . . . 
 In other words, is it possible, that in a free country, under a Constitu-
tion which declares the liberty of the press is essential to the security of 
freedom, and that it ought not to be restrained; is it possible, that it is 
not the right of every citizen to use the press for a good motive and justi-
fiable end? 
. . . . 
 In the opinion of this court, this right is inherent in every citizen, un-
der our Constitution, and a court of justice ha[s] no more right to deny to 
a person charged with a malicious use of the press, the liberty to show that 
its use was, in the particular case, for a good motive and a justifiable end, 
than it has a right to deny to a man indicted for murder, the liberty to 
show that he gave the blow for a purpose which the law justifies.
177
 
The liberty of the press, according to the court, was a right be-
longing to “each citizen” to use the press as an “instrument”—an in-
strument in the same sense that a “sword” is an instrument.178  This 
 
177 Id. at 11-13. 
178 One might view the “press” in the sense of the collective industry of newspaper 
publishing as an “instrument” in the hands of a politician, but one would not view it as 
an instrument in the hands of a particular newspaper publisher.  The “press” as a pub-
lisher’s instrument is likely the printing press.  See, e.g., Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 515 
(1855) (noting that under the Indiana Constitution’s free press clause, libel could lead 
to “loss, by forfeiture, of the particular press made the instrument of abuse” of the 
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reasoning suggests that the press was indeed seen as a technology that 
“every citizen” had a right to use, and not as an industry whose mem-
bers alone had a right to publish. 
2.  Dexter v. Spear (1825) and Root v. King (1827) 
Finally, two cases expressly stressed that printers and editors had 
precisely the same rights under the freedom of the press as other writ-
ers did.  Thus, in Dexter v. Spear, Justice Story (riding circuit) wrote 
that “[t]he liberty of speech and the liberty of the press do not author-
ize malicious and injurious defamation.  There can be no right in 
printers, any more than in other persons, to do wrong.”179  Similarly, 
Root v. King stated that, under the state constitution’s “liberty of the 
press,” newspaper editors have no “other rights than such as are 
common to all.”180 
As the cases suggest, lawyers for newspapers had by the 1820s in-
deed begun to make arguments for special protection for the press-as-
industry.181  But these arguments were consistently rejected. 
IV.  THE UNDERSTANDING AROUND THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
By the years surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the freedom of the press-as-technology understanding 
was even more clearly established.  To begin with, a long line of cases 
expressly held—as did Dexter v. Spear and Root v. King in the 1820s—
that the institutional press had no greater rights than anyone else.  
Thus, Aldrich v. Press Printing Co. (1864) held, “The press does not pos-
 
right to speak, write or print, freely, on any subject whatsoever), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Schmitt v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N.E. 19, 21 (Ind. 1918); HOLT, supra 
note 10, at 49-50 (characterizing the “press,” in the discussion of “liberty of the press,” 
as a “newly discovered instrument,” and stating that “[w]hen we have termed the press 
a new and enlarged instrument of publication, whether of good or evil, we have, in 
fact, pointed out that part of its nature which defines and circumscribes the law which 
attaches to it”); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCAN-
DALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOURS 163 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1813) (“The 
pencil of the caricaturist is frequently an instrument of ridicule more powerful than 
the press . . . .”); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCAN-
DALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOURS 142 (Edward D. Ingraham ed., New York, 
George Lamson 1st Am. ed. 1826) (same). 
179 7 F. Cas. 624, 624-25 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.R.I. 1825) (No. 3867). 
180 7 Cow. 613, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827). 
181 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 510, 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (acknowl-
edging such an argument about the common law rule, though not about the consti-
tutional protection). 
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sess any immunities, not shared by every individual.”182  Sheckell v. Jack-
son (1852) likewise upheld a jury instruction that stated, 
[I]t has been urged upon you that conductors of the public press are en-
titled to peculiar indulgence, and have especial rights and privileges.  
The law recognizes no such peculiar rights, privileges, or claims to in-
dulgence.  They have no rights but such as are common to all.  They have 
just the same rights that the rest of the community have, and no more.
183
 
Smart v. Blanchard (1860),184 Palmer v. City of Concord (1868),185 Atkins v. 
Johnson (1870),186 People v. Storey (1875),187 Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch 
Co. (1877),188 Sweeney v. Baker (1878),189 Barnes v. Campbell (1879),190 
and Delaware State Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Croasdale (1880)191 all ech-
oed this position. 
 
182 9 Minn. 123, 129 (1864). 
183 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 25, 26-27 (1852); see also Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio 293, 304 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“[Libel law] is quite consistent with that freedom of speech and 
of the press which all regard as sacred and inviolable.  Public journalists have no pecu-
liar exemption from the general rules of law on this subject, and are liable for injuri-
ous publications in precisely the same cases in which individuals in other professions 
or employments would be.”). 
184 See 42 N.H. 137, 151 (1860) (“The conductor of a public press has the same 
rights to publish information that others have, and no more.  He has no peculiar rights 
or special privileges or claims to indulgence.”). 
185 See 48 N.H. 211, 216 (1868) (“Conductors of the public press have no rights but 
such as are common to all.” (citing Sheckell, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) at 26-27)). 
186 See 43 Vt. 78, 82 (1870) (“The publisher of a newspaper has no more right [un-
der the ‘freedom of the press’] to publish a libel upon an individual, tha[n] he or any 
other man has to make a slanderous proclamation by word of mouth.”). 
187 See People v. Storey (Cook Cnty. Crim. Ct. 1875) (“Editors must understand that 
their rights are the same, and no greater, than other citizens, and their responsibilities no 
less.”), as reprinted in 1 JAMES APPLETON MORGAN, THE LAW OF LITERATURE 271, 275-76 
(New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1875), rev’d on other grounds, 79 Ill. 45 (1875). 
188 See 65 Mo. 539, 541-42 (1877) (stating that the “press should not, and under 
our constitution cannot, be muzzled,” but going on to say that a “‘newspaper proprie-
tor . . . is liable for what he publishes in the same manner as any other individual’” 
(quoting JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL 
§ 252, at 343 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1868))). 
189 See 13 W. Va. 158, 182 (1878) (quoting Sheckell, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) at 26-27, 
though citing it by the wrong name), overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. Charleston 
Mail Ass’n, 27 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1943), but reaffirmed on this point by Swearingen v. 
Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 26 S.E.2d 209 (W. Va. 1943). 
190 See 59 N.H. 128, 128-29 (1879) (“[P]rofessional publishers of news . . . have the 
same right to give information that others have, and no more.” (citing Sheckell, 64 Mass. 
(10 Cush.) 25)). 
191 See 11 Del. (6 Houst.) 181, 210 (Del. Super. Ct. 1880) (“Every man has the 
right, guaranteed to him by the constitution, to print upon any subject, being respon-
sible for the abuse of that liberty . . . . This law applies to publishers and editors as well 
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So did leading treatises and other reference works. Thomas Coo-
ley’s A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (1868) noted, in the sec-
tion on “Liberty of Speech and of the Press,” that “the authorities have 
generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid responsibility 
with any other person who makes injurious communications.”192  
Townshend’s A Treatise on the Wrongs Called Slander and Libel (1868) 
likewise noted, in the section on “freedom of the press,” that, “inde-
pendently of certain statutory provisions[,] the law recognizes no dis-
tinction in principle between a publication by the proprietor of a 
newspaper, and a publication by any other individual.  A newspaper 
proprietor . . . is liable for what he publishes in the same manner as 
any other individual.”193  Morgan’s Law of Literature (1875) noted, “[A] 
writer for a newspaper . . . stands in the same light precisely as other 
men; he is in no way privileged. . . . [T]he freedom of the press is, 
when rightly understood, commensurate and identical with the free-
dom of the individual, and nothing more.”194 
The one partial exception to this pattern appeared in the “Liberty 
of the Press” discussion in Cooley’s Treatise on the Law of Torts (1879), 
which suggested (without citation) that it “is not so clear” “whether 
the conductor of a public journal has any privilege above others in 
publishing.”195  But even that treatise stated that “the freedom of the 
press implies . . . a right in all persons to publish what they may see fit, 
being responsible for the abuse of the right”196 and that “[t]he privi-
lege of the press is not confined to those who publish newspapers and 
other serials, but extends to all who make use of it to place infor-
mation before the public.”197 
 
as to other individuals, and they have no privilege in this State not common to every-
body else.”).  
192 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 455 (Bos-
ton, Little, Brown & Co. 1868). 
193 TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 252, at 343.  Earlier, Townshend says that 
“[w]hatever else may be intended by the phrase ‘freedom of the press,’ or ‘liberty of 
the press,’ it means the freedom or liberty of those who conduct the press,” and in par-
ticular freedom from the requirement of a license to print.  Id. at 342.  But the more 
specific statements quoted in the text make clear that Townshend is recognizing that 
“those who conduct the press” had the same legal right as “any other individual” under 
the “freedom of the press.” 
194 2 MORGAN, supra note 187, at 410. 
195 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 217 (Chicago, Calla-
ghan & Co. 1879). 
196 Id. (emphasis added). 
197 Id. at 219.  A 1990 book quotes Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447 
(1868), as saying, “A special protection for newspapers within the common law was 
VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  5:47 PM 
2012] Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology? 501 
Some of the sources mentioned in this Section spoke of the press-
as-industry as having no special rights generally, while others noted 
this specifically in the context of libel law.  But it’s not surprising that 
many of these assertions were made in libel cases.  Freedom of the 
press arguments in the 1800s were most commonly made in libel cas-
es; libel law was probably the main restriction on publication.  And 
there were credible arguments for giving newspapers some special ex-
emption from the severest aspects of libel law.  As the “Freedom of the 
Press” section of Townshend’s Slander and Libel treatise noted, with 
sympathy, 
[A]s respects newspapers, it is argued that the exigencies of the business 
of a newspaper editor demand a larger amount of freedom.  That cir-
cumstances do not permit editors the opportunity to verify the truth, 
prior to publication, of all they feel called upon to publish, and that they 
 
necessary,”, but this appears to be an error.  TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG 
CONCEPT:  THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 67 (1990).  
No such passage is present in the cited case, and the purported quote does not seem 
like an accurate summary of the case either.  The court opinion concludes only that 
punitive damages are unavailable when a publisher took suitable care to avoid publish-
ing libels written by others, including by hiring “competent editors.”  16 Mich. at 454.  
This seems to be much the same rule that some courts applied to other employers, 
who were not held liable in punitive damages for the actions of their employees unless 
the employers were aware of the employees’ negligent habits or failed to properly su-
pervise them.  See generally THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 601, at 655 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1869).  And 
two decades later, the Michigan Supreme Court actually held unconstitutional a statute 
that limited presumed and punitive damages for publications in newspapers, on the 
grounds that the statute violated the constitutional right to protect reputation and that 
“the public press occupies no better ground than private persons publishing the same 
libelous matter.”  Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W. 731, 734 (Mich. 1888). 
 Likewise, Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363 (1871), which the 1990 book cited, GLEASON, 
supra, at 73-74, did not appear to extend any special protection to newspapers.  The 
court did state, 
The public interest, and a due regard to the freedom of the press, demands that 
its conductors should not be mulcted in punitive damages for publications on 
subjects of public interest, made from laudable motives, after due inquiry as to 
the truth of the facts stated, and in the honest belief that they were true. 
Id. at 383.  But punitive damages were generally available in libel cases only when the 
jury found the defendant acted from “ill-will” (which would not be a “laudable mo-
tive[]”), TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 290, at 382; and absence of an “honest belief 
that [defendant’s statements] were true” would itself be evidence of ‘ill-will,” id. § 388, 
at 475-76.  The court thus seemed to be applying to newspapers only the same protec-
tion against punitive damages that the law generally gave libel defendants.  A later Cal-
ifornia decision treated Wilson as consistent with the view that a reporter “has no more 
right” to convey allegedly defamatory material “than has a person not connected with a 
newspaper.”  Gilman v. McClatchy, 44 P. 241, 243 (Cal. 1896) (quoting McAllister v. 
Free Detroit Press Co., 43 N.W. 431, 437 (Mich. 1889)). 
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should not be responsible for the truth of what they publish.
198
 
But despite the presence and plausibility of these arguments, the cases 
kept saying (in Townshend’s words):  “A newspaper proprietor . . . is lia-
ble for what he publishes in the same manner as any other individual.”199 
Some other cases spoke of the liberty of the press in cases where 
the speaker was not a member of the institutional press.  In 1876, Life 
Ass’n of America v. Boogher held, just as Brandreth v. Lance had held, that 
it would violate “the freedom of the press or of speech”—“the right to 
speak, write, or print, . . . secured to every one” by the state constitu-
tion—for a court to enjoin publications and oral statements by a busi-
nessman that criticized another business.200  In 1846, Fisher v. Patterson, 
like many of the earlier cases from 1784 to 1840, mentioned the liber-
ty of the press in a case that involved a defendant who was apparently 
a businessman and a politician, not a newspaperman, though the 
court concluded that the liberty did not substantively extend to libels.201 
Finally, Thomas Cooley, the leading American constitutional 
commentator of the second half of the nineteenth century,202 wrote in 
1880 that “[b]ooks, pamphlets, circulars, &c. are . . . as much within 
[the freedom of the press] as the periodical issues.”203  This too shows 
that the liberty of the press extended to material that was generally 
not written by full-time newspaper and magazine writers and—at least 
in the case of circulars—to material that was often not funded by 
members of the press-as-industry. 
The rule thus had not changed from the early Republic to the 
Ratification era:  “the press” in “[t]he freedom . . . of the press” was 
 
198 TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 252, at 343; see also Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 
510, 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (noting that the defendant had argued for special privi-
lege as a newspaper editor, but rejecting that argument). 
199 TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 252 at 343.   
200  3 Mo. App. 173, 180 (1876); see also Suit Against the Life Association of America, 1 
INS. L.J. 239, 239 (1871) (reporting that Boogher was “a trustee of the Life Association 
of America, and one of the oldest policy holders in the company”). 
201 Fisher v. Patterson, 14 Ohio 418, 426-27 (1846); see also NELSON W. EVANS & 
EMMONS B. STIVERS, A HISTORY OF ADAMS COUNTY, OHIO 260-61 (1900) (describing 
John Fisher as a politician, judge, and businessman who was “fond of contributing po-
litical articles to newspapers,” but not suggesting that he ever owned or operated a 
newspaper). 
202 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008) (describing 
Cooley as the “most famous” of the “late-19th-century legal scholar[s]”); Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225 (1995) (referring to “the great constitutional 
scholar Thomas Cooley”). 
203 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 282 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880). 
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seen as referring to the press-as-technology, not to the press-as-
industry. 
V.  THE UNDERSTANDING FROM 1881 TO 1930 
By 1881, the view that the press-as-industry has no special consti-
tutional rights had become a firmly entrenched orthodoxy that 
would continue for the next fifty years and beyond.  Consider, for 
instance, Coleman v. MacLennan (1908), the case that first recognized 
something like an “actual malice” test for speech about public offi-
cials, and that was later cited prominently for this proposition by New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan:204 
Section 11 of the [Kansas] Bill of Rights sets off the inviolability of liberty 
of the press from the right of all persons freely to speak, write, or publish 
their sentiments on all subjects, and this fact has given rise to claims on 
the part of newspaper publishers of special privileges not enjoyed in 
common by all. . . . So far [such claims] have been rejected by the courts, 
and the present consensus of judicial opinion is that the press has the 
same rights as an individual, and no more.
205
 
Likewise, Negley v. Farrow (1883) held that “[t]he liberty of the press 
guaranteed by the Constitution is a right belonging to every one, 
whether proprietor of a newspaper or not.”206  And these were just two 
of the many cases to acknowledge the press-as-technology view during 
the last decades of the nineteenth century207 and during the start of 
the twentieth.208 
 
204 376 U.S. 254, 280-82 (1964).   
205 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908).   
206 60 Md. 158, 176 (1883). 
207 See, e.g., Riley v. Lee, 11 S.W. 713, 714 (Ky. 1889) (“By the provisions of the 
United States and the state constitutions guarantying the ‘freedom of the press’ it was 
simply intended to secure to the conductors of the press the same rights and immuni-
ties that are enjoyed by the public at large.”); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W. 
731, 734 (Mich. 1888) (“[T]he public press occupies no better ground than private 
persons publishing the same libelous matter . . . .”); Bronson v. Bruce, 26 N.W. 671, 
672 (Mich. 1886) (“The law makes no distinction between the newspaper publisher 
and any private person who may publish an article in a newspaper or other printed 
form.”); Pratt v. Pioneer Press, 14 N.W. 62, 63 (Minn. 1882) (“[I]n the publication of 
news, or in criticising men and things, the publisher of a newspaper has no privileges 
or immunities not possessed by any citizen.”); Kahn v. Cincinnati Times-Star, 10 Ohio 
Dec. 599, 603 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1890) (“The publisher of a newspaper has exactly 
the same [constitutional] rights and [is] responsible to exactly the same extent for the 
abuse of that right as any other citizen.”); Regensperger v. Kiefer, 7 A. 284, 285 (Pa. 
1887) (“The publisher or proprietor of a newspaper stands before a Court and before 
a jury like any other man.” (quoting jury instructions)); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 8 
Pa. C. 399, 405 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1890) (stating that the constitutional free press pro-
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Reference works of the era echoed this press-as-technology view, 
explaining that newspapers had the same freedoms of speech as pri-
vate citizens.  For instance, one 1917 work noted that “[i]t is well set-
tled that a newspaper or other printed publication has, as such, no 
peculiar privilege in commenting on matters of public interest.  It has 
no greater privilege with respect to such comment than has any pri-
vate person.”209  Similarly, a 1901 encyclopedia described the freedom 
of the press as “only a more extensive and improved use of the liberty 
of speech which prevailed before printing became general, and is the 
right belonging to every one, whether the conductor of a newspaper 
or not.”210  And a 1905 reference work noted that newspapers are 
treated the same as other speakers when it comes to freedom of the 
press claims in libel cases, and that this view “has been affirmed by the 
courts of this country and England with great uniformity.”211 
 
vision “does not give to newspapers, as such, any privileges or rights which are not giv-
en to every citizen of the state. . . . There is no distinction between newspapers as a 
privileged class, and other citizens as enjoying inferior rights”); Banner Publ’g Co. v. 
State, 84 Tenn. 176, 183-84 (1885) (concluding that, with reference to the state consti-
tutional provision for liberty of the press, “the conductor of a public journal has . . . no 
more rights than the private citizen”).    
208 See, e.g., State ex rel. Crow v. Shepherd, 76 S.W. 79, 94 (Mo. 1903) (stating, in 
the discussion of “the liberty of the press,” “It is no new claim that newspapers have a 
greater privilege than the ordinary citizen. This is a grave error.”); Fitch v. Daily News 
Publ’g Co., 217 N.W. 947, 948 (Neb. 1928) (“The usual constitutional guaranty of the 
freedom of the press . . . is intended simply to secure to the conductors of the press the 
same rights and immunities, and such only, as are enjoyed by the public at large.” 
(quoting 17 RULING CASE LAW § 95, at 349-50 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. 
Rich eds., 1917))); Streeter v. Emmons Cnty. Farmers’ Press, 222 N.W. 455, 457 (N.D. 
1928) (concluding that “[n]ewspapers . . . have no greater privilege [under libel law] 
than private individuals,” when it comes to the dividing line between “license” and “liber-
ty of the press” (citing 17 RULING CASE LAW, supra, § 95, at 349)); Williams v. Hicks Print-
ing Co., 150 N.W. 183, 188 (Wis. 1914) (stating that “[t]he law as to what is within the 
field of conditional privilege . . . applies to newspapers as well as to individuals” because 
“[t]he freedom of the press has never been . . . extended so as to accord to [newspapers] 
special rights to injure or destroy human character by libelous publications”).    
209 Annotation, Comment on Matter of Public Interest as Libel or Slander, 1917B ANNO-
TATED CASES AM. & ENG. 409, 417 (William M. McKinney & H. Noyes Greene eds., 
1917); see also 17 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 208, § 95, at 349-50 (“The usual consti-
tutional guaranty of the ‘freedom of the press’ . . . is intended simply to secure to the 
conductors of the press the same rights and immunities, and such only, as are enjoyed 
by the public at large.”).   
210 18 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 1051 (David S. Garland 
& Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1901); see also McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 43 
N.W. 431, 437 (Mich. 1889) (repeating this idea almost verbatim); HAYTER, supra note 
10, at 8 (similarly explaining, in 1754, that “[p]rinting is only a more extensive and 
improved Kind of Speech”); see also supra text accompanying note 60.   
211 8 JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES 7706 (1905). 
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VI.  THE MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT ERA: 
1931 TO NOW IN THE SUPREME COURT 
A.  Three Models 
The first Supreme Court decisions striking down government ac-
tion under the First Amendment came in 1931.212  Within the follow-
ing decade, the Court adopted the press-as-technology view of the 
Free Press Clause, and the Court’s decisions since then have stuck to 
that view. 
But since 1970, this state of the law has been cast into some doubt.  
Though the Court’s majority holdings have solidly supported the 
press-as-technology view, some dicta in the opinions have suggested 
that the Court might be open to the press-as-industry view in at least 
some cases.  And a few lower court decisions have indeed adopted a 
press-as-industry position as to some First Amendment questions. 
To accurately summarize the disagreements among the courts—
and the continuing dominance of the press-as-technology view, de-
spite those disagreements—it’s helpful to identify three possible ap-
proaches to the question: 
1. Under the “all-speakers-equal” view, communicators are 
treated the same whether or not they use mass communi-
cations.  “The freedom of speech, or of the press,” the 
theory goes, provides the same protection for the rights to 
“speak,” “write,” and “print.”213 
2. Under the “mass-communications-more-protected” view, 
the Free Press Clause provides special protection to all us-
ers of the press-as-technology. 
3. Under the “press-as-industry-specially-protected” view, the 
Free Press Clause provides special protection to the insti-
tutional press. 
The first two approaches both fit the press-as-technology model.  
(The historical origin of the distinction between the first two ap-
 
212 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 701-02, 722-23 (1931); Strom-
berg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).  Fiske v. Kansas, the other possible candi-
date for the first such decision, rested on the conclusion that the Due Process Clause 
was violated because there wasn’t adequate evidence to convict the speaker under the 
statute.  274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927).  Stromberg and Near, on the other hand, expressly re-
lied on the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
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proaches is outside the scope of this Article.214  I mention them sepa-
rately only because understanding the difference helps explain some 
of the court decisions discussed below.)  The third approach is, of 
course, the press-as-industry model. 
Here, then, is what has happened. 
B.  The Supreme Court:  “All Speakers Equal” 
1.  Generally 
As discussed below, the Court’s decisions since 1931 generally take 
the all-speakers-equal view.  The one possible exception comes in Jus-
tice Powell’s influential concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes (1972),215 
which has been read by some lower courts as adopting a mass-
communications-more-protected approach. 
Many of the post-1931 cases do sometimes refer to the concerns 
and rights of “newspapers” and “the media.”  Consider, for instance, 
the passage in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that says, “Whether or not 
a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of 
fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public 
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms 
cannot survive.”216  But this seems to stem just from courts’ tendency 
to focus on the facts of the cases before them.  Thus, for instance, 
within about a year of Sullivan, the Court applied its holding to two 
non-newspaper defendants—a district attorney who made allegedly 
libelous statements at a press conference,217 and an arrestee who was 
sued for sending an allegedly libelous letter to a sheriff and an alleg-
 
214 For evidence suggesting that the freedom of the press was seen as quite differ-
ent from the freedom of speech, see generally Anderson, supra note 67, at 521-27.  For 
evidence suggesting that the two were seen as providing essentially the same protec-
tions, though one covered printing and the other speaking, see United States v. Shel-
don, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337, 346 (Mich. 1829), which stated that “[t]he constitu-
tion of the United States places the freedom of speech and of the press upon the same 
footing,” Lange, supra note 17, at 88-99, and sources cited supra Section I.E. 
215 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972). 
216 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 
(1974) (stating that the Court’s decision “shields the press and broadcast media from 
the rigors of strict liability for defamation”); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 
418 U.S. 264, 292 (1974) (characterizing an earlier labor law case as “adopt[ing] as a 
rule of labor law pre-emption the constitutional standard of media liability for defama-
tion originally enunciated for libel actions by public officials in New York Times Co. [v. 
Sullivan]”). 
217 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64-67 (1964). 
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edly libelous press release to the wire services.218  The references to 
newspaper speech, then, may simply describe the speech involved in 
each case, rather than limiting the constitutional protection just to 
newspapers. 
Because of this, the analysis below looks at the aggregate holdings 
of the cases and at the specific discussions of the all-speakers- 
equal vs. mass-communications-more-protected vs. press-as-industry-
specially-protected question.  And such a focus makes clear the Court’s 
general adoption of the all-speakers-equal model (again, with the possi-
ble exception of Justice Powell’s Branzburg v. Hayes concurrence). 
2.  The “Generally Applicable Laws” Cases 
The Court’s first case on whether the press-as-industry had special 
constitutional rights was Associated Press v. NLRB (1937).219  The Asso-
ciated Press argued that the Free Press Clause secured a right to fire 
writers and editors for any reason, including labor union membership 
(which the AP thought could lead to bias in reporting news), notwith-
standing federal labor law.220  The Court disagreed, holding that 
“[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the ap-
plication of general laws.”221 
The Court has repeated this rejection of the press-as-industry-
specially-protected model in cases involving many subjects, including 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, antitrust law, and others.222  In Branzburg 
v. Hayes (1972), for instance, the majority rejected a newsgatherer’s 
privilege, adopting the all-speakers-equal—and equally unprotected—
approach.223  The Court’s decision was partly motivated by its unwilling-
ness to give special constitutional protection to a particular industry: 
 
218 See Henry v. Collins, 158 So. 2d 28, 30-31 (Miss. 1963), rev’d per curiam, 380 U.S. 
356 (1965). 
219 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
220 Id. at 115-17. 
221 Id. at 132. 
222 See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (stating 
that the press receives no special treatment under the First Amendment with respect to 
the antitrust laws); Mabee v. White Plains Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) (stating, 
in the labor context, that the press “has no special immunity from laws applicable to 
business in general”); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating 
that the press receives no special treatment under the First Amendment with respect to 
the antitrust laws). 
223 See 408 U.S. 665, 689-93 (1972) (“We are asked to create another [privilege] by 
interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other 
citizens do not enjoy.  This we decline to do.”). 
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The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would pre-
sent practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.  Sooner or lat-
er, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who 
qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the tradi-
tional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pam-
phleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the 
large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition 
methods. . . . 
 Freedom of the press is a “fundamental personal right” which “is not 
confined to newspapers and periodicals.  It necessarily embraces pam-
phlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation compre-
hends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information 
and opinion.”  Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938).  See also 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105, 111 (1943).  The informative function asserted by representa-
tives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lec-
turers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.  
Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to 
the flow of information to the  public, that he relies on confidential 
sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is 
forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.
224
 
Justice Powell’s three-paragraph concurrence in Branzburg, which 
was open to a relatively weak newsgatherer’s privilege,225 did implicitly 
reject the all-speakers-equal approach.  Under Justice Powell’s ap-
proach, a person who gathers information for future mass communica-
tion would get a privilege of some unspecified force.  But a person who 
gathers information just to convey it to business partners or friends 
would presumably not be entitled to a privilege, since allowing the privi-
lege to apply so broadly would eviscerate the general duty to testify. 
 
224 Id. at 703-05.  In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court likewise rejected a claim of 
special press immunity from search warrants.  436 U.S. 547, 565-67 (1978).  Only Jus-
tice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, would have adopted what appears to be a press-
as-industry-specially-protected model.  See id. at 571-72 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Powell’s concurrence suggested that “independent values protected by the First 
Amendment” should be considered in deciding whether a warrant should be issued, id. 
at 570 (Powell, J., concurring), but Justice Powell might well have been referring to 
First Amendment interests of speakers generally, and not just of the press-as-industry.  
Indeed, the Zurcher majority, which Justice Powell joined, cited an earlier nonpress opin-
ion which determined that the particularity of the Warrant Clause should be read more 
strictly when the search was for “books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memo-
randa, pictures, recordings and other written instruments.”  Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 
476, 485-86 (1965), quoted in Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564. 
225 See Branzburg, 665 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Powell did 
not endorse the proposed absolute privilege urged by Justice Douglas’s dissent, nor the 
proposed qualified privilege urged by Justice Stewart’s dissent, which could only be 
overcome by a showing of necessity to serve a compelling government interest.  Id. 
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Nonetheless, Justice Powell’s concurrence is probably most rea-
sonably read as following the mass-communications-more-protected 
model rather than the press-as-industry-specially-protected model.  
Justice Powell joined the majority’s opinion, which rejected the press-
as-industry model.  And though Justice Powell’s concurrence spoke of 
the rights of “newsmen,”226 it didn’t go into any detail about whether 
“newsman” meant simply someone who worked for a newspaper or 
whether the term also included someone who gathered the news for 
just one project or occasional projects.  Indeed, as Section VII.A will 
discuss, nearly all lower court cases have either dismissed Justice Pow-
ell’s opinion as merely a concurrence, or have read it as endorsing the 
mass-communications-specially-protected approach rather than the 
press-as-industry-specially-protected” approach. 
Finally, and most recently, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991), the 
Court rejected a newspaper’s attempt to use the First Amendment as a 
defense to a promissory estoppel suit brought by a source whose name 
was published despite the newspaper’s promise of anonymity.227  
“[G]enerally applicable laws,” the Court held, “do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”228 
The Court has long been willing to give speakers generally some ex-
emptions from “generally applicable laws.”  This is especially true 
when the laws end up applying to speakers because of the content of 
their speech—for instance, when a breach of the peace prosecution, 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress lawsuit, an interference 
with business relations claim, or an antitrust claim is based on the con-
tent of the speaker’s message.229  But within this category of speakers, 
neither members of the press-as-industry nor users of the press-as-
technology have received more protection than other speakers. 
 
226 Id. 
227 501 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1991).   
228 Id. at 669.  Three of the four dissenters expressly agreed on this point.  See id. at 
673 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (stating that 
“[n]ecessarily, the First Amendment protection” against promissory estoppel liability 
for revealing the name of a source “afforded respondents would be equally available to 
nonmedia defendants”).  The fourth dissenter, Justice O’Connor, expressed no opin-
ion on the issue. 
229 See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:  Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1277, 1287-93 (2005) (citing pre-2005 examples of such cases); see also Snyder v. 
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (applying this principle to a lawsuit for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). 
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3.  The Literature Distribution Cases 
The Court has likewise rejected the press-as-industry view in the 
cases dealing with people prosecuted for handing out printed materi-
al.  The first such case, Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), expressly held 
that the freedom of the press extends beyond the press-as-industry: 
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.  It 
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.  These indeed have been 
historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas 
Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its 
historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which af-
fords a vehicle of information and opinion.
230
 
And Lovell was reaffirmed in Schneider v. State (1939),231 Martin v. City of 
Struthers (1943),232 and Jamison v. Texas (1943),233 in which the Court 
cited the Free Press Clause in striking down ordinances that limited 
the distribution of handbills, circulars, and advertisements—
ordinances that, unlike the Lovell ordinance, didn’t even apply to typi-
cal newspapers or magazines.  In Schneider and Martin, the Court dis-
cussed both the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech, but 
in Jamison it mentioned only the freedom of the press. 
Moreover, at around the time the Court decided these cases, it al-
so applied the same rules to speakers who weren’t using mass com-
munications technology at all—door-to-door canvassers, picketers, 
speakers in public places, and the like.234  Put together, these cases 
thus embrace the all-speakers-equal view, and reject the press-as-
industry-specially-protected view. 
4.  The Communicative Tort Cases 
The results of the Supreme Court’s communicative tort cases seem to 
be most consistent with the all-speakers-equal approach, though they 
 
230 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).  The city’s brief had argued that nothing in the rec-
ord suggested “that the appellant is a member of the press or that an ordinance 
abridging the freedom of the press would apply to her.”  Brief of Appellee at 12, Lovell, 
303 U.S. 444 (No. 391).  But the brief cited no precedents supporting the view that the 
freedom of the press protected only “member[s] of the press”—I suspect because no 
such precedents were available. 
231 308 U.S. 147, 160-64 (1939). 
232 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
233 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943). 
234 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (door-to-door can-
vassing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (picketing); Hague v. CIO, 
307 U.S. 496, 512-14 (1939) (speeches in public places and in privately owned halls). 
VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  5:47 PM 
2012] Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology? 511 
might also be reconciled with the mass-communications-more-protected 
approach.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), Sullivan sued over an 
advertisement that criticized him, naming both the New York Times, which 
published the advertisement, and several ministers who signed it.235  The 
Court reversed the verdict against both the newspaper and the signers, 
applying the same “actual malice” rule to both.236 
In the process, the Court seemed to suggest that this identical rule 
stemmed from two different sources—the Free Press Clause as to 
newspapers, and the Free Speech Clause as to the signers: 
That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immate-
rial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are 
sold. . . . Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from  
carrying “editorial advertisements” of this type, and so might shut off an 
important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by per-
sons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities—who wish to 
exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press.  Cf. 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164.
237
 
Though Lovell had asserted the Free Press Clause rights of pamphlet-
eering and leafleting defendants who were not “members of the 
press,” Sullivan recharacterized such rights as being the “freedom of 
speech,” not the “freedom of the press.” 
But it’s not clear what to make of the particular label that the 
Court used for the rights involved, since in the last half century the 
Court has tended to use “freedom of speech” broadly.  And in any 
event, the bottom line was that the signers of the New York Times adver-
tisement—who were communicating through the mass media but 
weren’t themselves newspaper owners or writers—were given the ben-
efit of precisely the same constitutional rule as the newspaper. 
The same principle was applied in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964).238  
Garrison, a district attorney, was prosecuted for criminal libel because 
of his statement at a press conference condemning several judges.239  
The Court held that Garrison was entitled to the protection of the Sul-
livan “actual malice” rule, without being influenced by Garrison’s not 
being a member of the press-as-industry. 
 
235 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).   
236 Id. at 283-84.   
237 Id. at 266 (emphasis added) (select citations omitted). 
238 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
239 Id. at 64-65.   
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The Garrison decision did speak of the “freedom of expression,”240 
rather than the “freedom of the press.”  But though Garrison could 
have been seen as exercising the “freedom of the press”—he was try-
ing to convey his views through the press, though filtered by the re-
porters who wrote the actual stories—the broader “freedom of expres-
sion” likely seemed to be a more natural label for the right involved 
here.  And in any event, nothing turned on the label:  the Free Speech 
Clause rule that protected Garrison was identical to the Free Press 
Clause that protected the New York Times. 
Likewise, in Henry v. Collins (1965), the Court applied the Sullivan 
rule to an arrestee who issued a statement—sent to the sheriff and to 
wire services241—alleging that his arrest stemmed from a “diabolical 
plot.”242  In St. Amant v. Thompson (1968), the Court applied the Sulli-
van rule to a politician who was sued for libel based on a statement he 
read on a televised program.243  The Court didn’t indicate in either 
case whether the decisions were based on the Free Speech Clause or 
the Free Press Clause, likely because it made no difference.  And 
McDonald v. Smith (1985) further reinforced the notion that the rules 
are the same under all the expression-related clauses of the First 
Amendment, by holding that the Petition Clause provided the same 
protection against libel lawsuits in petitions to the government as did 
cases such as Garrison and Sullivan.244 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991) echoed this view by holding that 
the press-as-industry gets no exemption from laws that don’t single out 
the press245 and by citing a communicative tort case, Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., as an example of this principle.246  The opin-
ion cited Zacchini for the proposition that “[t]he press, like others in-
terested in publishing,” is bound by copyright law.247  It thus appears 
that the Court believes that the press-as-industry gets no exemptions 
 
240 Id. at 75. 
241 158 So. 2d 28, 30 (Miss. 1963), rev’d per curiam, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). 
242 380 U.S. at 356. 
243 390 U.S. 727, 728, 733 (1968). 
244 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985). 
245 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).  For more on why Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. is proper-
ly read as discussing laws that apply equally to the press and to other speakers, see Vo-
lokh, supra note 229, at 1294-97. 
246 501 U.S. at 669 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 
576-79 (1977)). 
247 Id. 
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from communicative torts generally—not just libel, but also copyright 
infringement, and likely, as in Zacchini itself, the right of publicity.248 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2000) likewise held that the First Amendment 
equally protected a radio broadcaster and the person who gave him 
allegedly actionable material.249  Bartnicki arose under federal statutes 
that banned both the interception of cellular phone conversations 
and the willful dissemination of such conversations, including dissem-
ination by people who were unconnected to the person who did the 
interception.250  An unknown person had intercepted a conversation 
in which local teachers’ union leaders seemed to be discussing possi-
ble violent attacks on school board members.251  That tape was left in 
the mailbox of Jack Yocum—“the head of a local taxpayers’ organiza-
tion” and a political foe of the union—and Yocum delivered it to ra-
dio show host Frederick Vopper.252  The union leaders sued both 
Yocum and Vopper.253 
The Court concluded that the First Amendment trumped the ban 
on dissemination, at least on the facts of the case.254  But in the process 
of deciding the First Amendment question, the Court stressed that it 
“dr[ew] no distinction between the media respondents and Yocum.”255  
The first citation the Court gave in support of this statement was to 
the passage from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan mentioned above, 
which noted that “persons who do not themselves have access to pub-
lishing facilities” are protected by the First Amendment when they pay 
others for access to their media platforms.256  The Court’s second cita-
tion was to a passage in First National Bank of Boston v.  
Bellotti in which the Court held that “[t]he inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not de-
 
248 See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 
2010) (observing that “copyright infringement . . . is often characterized as a tort,” and 
treating it as such (citation omitted)).  Copyright infringement is the intellectual 
property analog of trespass—an interference with a property owner’s exclusive rights.  
And in Zacchini, the Court treated copyright infringement as analogous to the right of 
publicity tort.  See 433 U.S. at 567. 
249 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001). 
250 Id. at 523-24.   
251 Id. at 518-19.   
252 Id. at 519.  
253 Id.   
254 Id. at 535.   
255 Id. at 525 & n.8. 
256 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).   
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pend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, 
union, or individual.”257 
Finally, Snyder v. Phelps (2011) held that picketers near a funeral 
had a First Amendment defense to the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.258  The foremost precedent on the subject, Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,259 involved a media defendant, but Snyder fol-
lowed and extended Hustler’s reasoning without any suggestion that 
the picketers merited less protection than the professional publisher 
in Hustler.  The Snyder Court didn’t expressly discuss whether media 
defendants should be treated differently from speakers—such as the 
picketers in Snyder itself—who are neither members of the press-as-
industry nor directly using channels of mass communication (except 
insofar as they are hoping for media coverage).  But the Court’s firm 
acceptance of the analogy between Snyder and Hustler is consistent 
with the press-as-technology view adopted by the other cases cited in 
this Section. 
The Court thus has not accepted the press-as-industry-specially-
protected view in communicative torts cases.  And it also seems—
though the matter is less clear—that it has taken the all-speakers- 
equal view rather than the mass-communications-more-protected view. 
First, the cases above show that the Court considers the same rules 
to apply interchangeably under both the Free Speech Clause and the 
Free Press Clause.  This suggests that these rules apply to speakers in 
non-mass-communications settings exercising their Free Speech 
Clause rights (say, a hypothetical Garrison or Yocum who is making 
accusations only to his political allies) as much as to speakers who are 
exercising their Free Speech Clause rights by speaking to the media.  
Whatever distinction the Free Press Clause might or might not draw be-
tween mass communications and other communications, there’s no in-
dication that the Free Speech Clause could embody such a distinction. 
Second, the Court in McDonald v. Smith (1985) took the view that 
the Petition Clause rules are the same as those applicable under both 
the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause.260  Speech in most 
petitions to the government is not an attempt to engage in mass com-
munications; for instance, the petitions in McDonald were letters to the 
President.261  If such non-mass-communications speech to the gov-
 
257 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).   
258 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
259 See 485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988). 
260 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).   
261 Id. at 480.   
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ernment is protected by the Petition Clause, and the First Amend-
ment rules are the same under all three clauses, then non-mass-
communications speech to others should also be protected by the 
Free Speech Clause. 
Third, one of the Supreme Court’s libel cases, Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985), did involve speech that wasn’t 
intended for mass communications technology.262  The Dun & Brad-
street Court held that a credit report sent out to five subscribers was 
less protected than speech on matters of “public concern.”263  But 
while Justice Powell’s opinion concluded that the limited audience for 
the speech suggested that the speech was less likely to be of “public 
concern”—and the other Justices in the majority presumably agreed 
on this score—the Court expressly declined to adopt the me-
dia/nonmedia distinction the Vermont Supreme Court adopted be-
low.264  Indeed, five Justices (Justice White in his concurrence, and 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in dissent) specifi-
cally repudiated such a distinction.265 
Moreover, the test that the Court adopted, which only applies full 
constitutional protection to speech on matters of “public concern,” 
stemmed from a case in which some non-mass-communications 
speech was found to be of “public concern”—Connick v. Myers 
(1983).266  In Connick, a government employee’s question to coworkers 
about whether supervisors illegally pressured employees to work on 
political campaigns was deemed to raise issues of “public concern.”267  
Connick itself characterized an earlier case, Givhan v. Western Line Consol-
idated School District (1979),268 as involving speech on a matter of “public 
 
262 See 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (noting that the 
communication at issue was a “confidential” credit report).   
263 Id. at 763; see also id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (agree-
ing with Justice Powell on this point); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (same). 
264 Id. at 753, 762 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).   
265 See id. at 781 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissent-
ing) (arguing that “[s]uch a distinction is irreconcilable with the fundamental First 
Amendment principle that ‘[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978))). 
266 461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983).   
267 Id.  The Dun & Bradstreet plurality expressly relied on Connick in reaching its 
holding.  472 U.S. at 759-61.  Other speech in Connick was found not to be of public 
concern, but only because it was seen as motivated merely by the speaker’s personal 
employment dispute with her employer.  461 U.S. at 148-49.   
268 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
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concern,” even though that speech consisted solely of an employee’s 
statement to her employer.269  And two years after Dun & Bradstreet, 
Rankin v. McPherson (1987) held that a county employee’s statement to 
a coworker qualified as speech on a matter of “public concern.”270 
So on balance, Dun & Bradstreet, McDonald, and the other cases 
cited above suggest that the Court is taking the all-speakers-equal view 
of the First Amendment.  And the cases certainly do not support the 
press-as-industry-specially-protected view. 
5.  The Campaign Speech Cases 
Campaign finance laws have restricted various kinds of election-
related speech, including corporate speech,271 speech that costs more 
than $1000,272 and speech coordinated with a candidate.273  Newspa-
pers and magazines, of course, routinely engage in such speech, but 
so-called “media exemptions” to campaign finance laws have excluded 
the press-as-industry from such restrictions.274  The Supreme Court has 
thus never considered a case in which the press-as-industry directly 
sought a constitutional entitlement to exemptions from campaign fi-
nance law. 
But in Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the Court did specifically re-
ject the press-as-industry-specially-protected model.275  The majority 
argued that if restrictions on corporate expression about candidates 
were constitutional, then newspapers—which are mostly owned by 
 
269 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.   
270 483 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1987). 
271 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating such a re-
striction). 
272 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam) (invalidating such a 
restriction). 
273 See id. at 46-47 (discussing such a restriction). 
274 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2006) (exempting from mandatory campaign 
disclosures expenditures for the production of “any news story, commentary, or edito-
rial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, 
or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any 
political party, political committee, or candidate”); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1990) (describing a state election law that exempted 
any “expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
or publication for any news story, commentary, or editorial in support of or opposition 
to a candidate for elective office . . . in the regular course of publication or broadcast-
ing” (alteration in original)). 
275 See 130 S. Ct. at 905-06 (“There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to 
distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corpora-
tions and those which are not . . . . This differential treatment cannot be squared with 
the First Amendment.”). 
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corporations—could likewise be restricted.276  The dissent suggested 
that this need not be so, since newspapers and similar publications 
might still have Free Press Clause rights that other corporations inter-
ested in publishing material did not have.277  But the majority rejected 
this argument, instead deciding that “the institutional press” has no 
“constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers”—so that any 
restrictions that could be constitutionally imposed on nonmedia cor-
porations could likewise be imposed on media corporations.278 
And though Citizens United overruled portions of McConnell v. FEC 
(2003)279 and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990),280 those 
earlier cases were not inconsistent with Citizens United on this point.  
McConnell was silent on the issue.281  Austin noted that “the press’ 
unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection 
under the Constitution,” and held only that a media exemption was 
constitutionally permissible, not that it was constitutionally mandatory.282 
In the process, the Court in Austin cited First National Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti (1978), another campaign speech case that rejected the 
“suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institu-
tional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the 
same communication by” nonmedia corporations.283  Three of the 
four dissenters in Bellotti agreed with the majority on this point, con-
cluding that “the First Amendment does not immunize media corpo-
rations any more than other types of corporations from restrictions 
upon electoral contributions and expenditures,” presumably includ-
ing expenditures incurred to convey their views about the election.284 
In the Court’s first campaign finance speech case, United States v. 
CIO (1948), a four-Justice concurrence—written by Justice Rutledge 
and joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy—likewise rejected 
the press-as-industry-specially-protected model.285  In that case, the 
CIO challenged a federal ban on the use of corporate and union 
 
276 Id. at 906.   
277 Id. at 951 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
278 Id. at 905 (majority opinion) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)). 
279 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
280 494 U.S. 652.   
281 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.   
282 Austin, 494 U.S. at 668. 
283 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978). 
284 Id. at 808 n.8 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). 
285 335 U.S. 106, 154-55 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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funds for election-related speech.286  The majority interpreted the 
statute narrowly, as excluding union-owned newspapers.287  But the 
concurring Justices would have gone further and invalidated the stat-
ute altogether, holding as a general matter that sporadic publication 
by nonmedia organizations is entitled to the same constitutional pro-
tection as regular publications: 
I know of nothing in the Amendment’s policy or history which turns or 
permits turning the applicability of its protections upon the difference 
between regular and merely casual or occasional distributions.  Indeed 
pamphleteering was a common mode of exercising freedom of the 
press before and at the time of the Amendment’s adoption.  It cannot 
have been intended to tolerate exclusion of this form of exercising that 
freedom.
288
 
The majority’s conclusion that the statute did not cover the CIO’s 
speech made it unnecessary for the majority to respond to this  
argument. 
Finally, there has been no indication from campaign speech cases 
that the Court would accept even the mass-communications-more-
protected model of the Free Press Clause; in fact, McConnell v. FEC 
(2003) quickly rejected this model.289  It seems unlikely that the Justic-
es would treat spending $10,000 to print and mail campaign literature 
as constitutionally different from spending $10,000 to organize a polit-
ical rally.290 
 
286 Id. at 108-09 (majority opinion).  
287 Id. at 123-24. 
288 Id. at 155 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment). 
289 See 540 U.S. 93, 209 n.89 (2003).  A Congressman, an advocacy group, and 
some other plaintiffs in McConnell argued at the district court level that they were enti-
tled to Free Press Clause protection, on a press-as-technology theory.  See McConnell v. 
FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 233-34 & n.61 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff’d in part, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003), overruled in part as to other matters by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010).  But the district court took an all-speakers-equal view, and concluded that the 
Free Press Clause provided no more protection for mass communications speakers 
than does the Free Speech Clause, and that the reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo allows 
some restrictions on both Free Speech Clause and Free Press Clause rights as to cam-
paign-related speech.  Id. at 234-36.  And the Supreme Court expressly agreed with the 
district court on this point.  540 U.S. at 209 n.89. 
290 The Court’s campaign finance cases have all discussed the First Amendment 
generally, with occasional references to the freedom of speech.  See, e.g., Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (mentioning the First Amendment 109 times, and the “free-
dom of speech” and “free speech” only thirteen times in total). 
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6.  The Access to Government Facilities Cases 
In Pell v. Procunier (1974), the Court likewise adopted the all-
speakers-equal view as to access to government facilities. Three “pro-
fessional journalists” sought the right to interview prison inmates face-
to-face, but the Court disagreed: 
“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guaran-
tee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not 
available to the public generally. . . . Newsmen have no constitutional 
right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public 
is excluded.”  Branzburg v. Hayes, [408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)].  Similar-
ly, newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their in-
mates beyond that afforded the general public. 
 The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from inter-
fering in any way with a free press.  The Constitution does not, however, 
require government to accord the press special access to information not 
shared by members of the public generally.
291
 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. (1974), decided the same day, took the 
same view.292  Even Justice Powell’s dissent, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, expressly said, 
[N]either any news organization nor reporters as individuals have consti-
tutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens.  The guar-
antees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of every citizen; 
they do not create special privileges for particular groups or individuals.  
For me, at least, it is clear that persons who become journalists acquire 
thereby no special immunity from governmental regulation. To this ex-
tent I agree with the majority.
293
 
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Pell and Saxbe, disagreed, arguing in Pell 
that “the press” is “the institution which ‘[t]he Constitution specifical-
ly selected . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public af-
fairs,’” and that the press-as-industry stood on a different footing from 
the public when it came to access.294  But the majority did not accept 
this view; and even though Justices Brennan and Marshall joined 
Douglas’s dissent, their views on this issue are hard to pin down—they 
 
291 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (citation altered). 
292 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); see also id. (“[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right 
of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.” (quot-
ing Pell, 417 U.S. at 834)). 
293 Id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
294 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (al-
teration in original) (citation omitted). 
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also joined Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe, which contradicted Doug-
las’s view on this point. 
A majority of the Justices in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. (1978) likewise 
accepted the Pell view in rejecting a claimed right of access to prisons 
for videorecording purposes.295  Three of the seven participating Jus-
tices asserted that the press has no extra First Amendment rights be-
yond those held by the public at large.296  Three more quoted similar 
language from Pell, without any suggestion that they disagreed with 
it.297  Only Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, concluded that 
the media should have the right to videorecord prison conditions 
even if the general public lacked that right.298 
Finally, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), which held 
that the First Amendment generally prohibited the closure of trials, 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence ( joined by Justice Marshall) expressly 
noted that the case didn’t raise the question “whether the media 
should enjoy greater access rights than the general public.”299  But the 
majority in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978) had answered 
the question in the negative, holding that “[t]he First Amendment 
generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superi-
or to that of the general public.”300  And before Nixon, Estes v. Texas 
(1965) stated in dicta that “[a]ll [journalists] are entitled to the same 
rights [of access to trials] as the general public.”301 
7.  The Footnotes 
So it seems that the Court is likely following the all-speakers-equal 
approach and is definitely not following the “special protection for the 
press as industry” approach.  Still, from 1979 to 1990, footnotes in five 
 
295 See 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
296 Id. at 11. 
297 Id. at 27-28 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Powell, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 
Pell, 417 U.S. 834).  The dissent’s view was that the policy unconstitutionally interfered 
with access to information about the prison, both for the press and the public as a 
whole.  Id. at 28-30. 
298 Id. at 16-17 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]erms of access that 
are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they impede ef-
fective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to journal-
ists . . . .”). 
299 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
300 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); see also id. (denying a claimed right to make copies of 
tape recordings introduced at a criminal trial).  Three Justices dissented in Nixon, but 
none of the dissenters discussed the First Amendment question.  See id. at 611. 
301 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).   
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majority opinions expressly reserved the question whether “nonmedia 
defendant[s]” were unprotected by parts of the Court’s emerging libel 
case law,302 even though a majority of the Justices who sat on the Court 
during that era—Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
White—had, on various occasions, concluded that nonmedia defend-
ants should be treated the same as media defendants.303  This has sig-
naled to lower courts that the question remains open.  And a few lower 
courts have indeed applied the First Amendment differently to media 
and non-media defendants, both before 1979 and after. 
VII.  THE PRESS-AS-INDUSTRY IN THE LOWER 
COURT CASES:  1970 TO NOW 
From the 1930s to the 1960s, lower court cases often repeated that 
the institutional press had no special First Amendment rights, whether 
generally304 or regarding libel law,305 the duty to testify notwithstanding 
 
302 See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 309 n.16 (1979); 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Un-
ion, 466 U.S. 485, 492 n.8 (1984); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 
n.4 (1986); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990).  Likewise, Chief 
Justice Burger noted that “[t]he Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press 
Clause confers upon the ‘institutional press’ any freedom from government restraint 
not enjoyed by all others,” though he argued that the Free Press Clause should be read 
as not conferring any such special protection.  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  
303 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781 
(1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (con-
cluding that the proposed distinction between “media” and nonmedia defendants is 
“irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that ‘[t]he inherent 
worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or individu-
al’” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777)); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“I agree with Justice Brennan that the First Amendment gives no more protec-
tion to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of 
speech.”); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23-24 n.2 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (repeating Justice Brennan’s position in Dun & Bradstreet on the subject); Hepps, 
475 U.S. at 780 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring) (same); cf. Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 674 (1991) (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall & Souter, 
JJ., dissenting) (“Necessarily, the First Amendment protection [against promissory estop-
pel liability for revealing the name of a source] afforded respondents would be equally 
available to nonmedia defendants.”).  In Dun & Bradstreet, the other four Justices ex-
pressed no opinion on the issue; the dissent and Justice White discussed it because the 
lower court and the parties had done so.  See 472 U.S. at 773-74 (White, J., concurring in 
the judgment); id. at 781 (Brennan, J, dissenting). 
304 See, e.g., Curry v. Journal Publ’g Co., 68 P.2d 168, 174-75 (N.M. 1937) (stating, 
in the discussion of the “freedom of the press,” that “[a] publisher of a newspaper has 
the same rights, no more or less, than individuals, to speak, write, or publish his views 
and sentiments, and is subject to the same restrictions”), overruled on other grounds by 
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a promise of confidentiality made to a source,306 access to trials,307 or 
access to government documents.308 
When, then, did the press-as-industry-specially-protected decisions 
(and the mass-communications-more-protected decisions) first arise, 
and how common have they been?  Answering this might be both his-
torically interesting and practically useful for determining just how 
firmly rooted—or not—these models have become.  And examining 
cases that have adopted these models, especially the press-as-industry-
specially-protected model, may identify helpful test cases for future 
discussions of whether the models are wise. 
The answer seems to be that the first cases departing from the all-
speakers-equal model were decided in the 1970s.  Moreover, even 
since the 1970s, there have only been about a dozen press-as-industry-
 
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983); Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 
238 (Fla. 1933) (concluding that the “constitutional guaranty of ‘freedom of the press’” 
“was simply intended to secure to the conductors of the press the same rights and im-
munities, and such rights and immunities only, as were enjoyed by the public at large”). 
305 See, e.g., Leers v. Green, 131 A.2d 781, 788-89 (N.J. 1957) (concluding that the 
American “freedom . . . of press” tracked the English rule that “the press and the pub-
lic have the same right of fair comment,” a conclusion that in this case helped the 
nonmedia defendants get the same protection as the media defendants); Swearingen v. 
Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 26 S.E.2d 209, 215 (W. Va. 1943) (“The publisher of a newspa-
per has no greater privilege to publish defamatory matter than any other person.”). 
306 See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (Or. 1968) (“Indeed, it would be 
difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special constitutional rights for those 
possessing credentials as news gatherers which would not conflict with the equal-
privileges and equal-protection concepts also found in the Constitution.  Freedom of 
the press is a right which belongs to the public; it is not the private preserve of those 
who possess the implements of publishing.” (footnote omitted)).  Another case from 
the 1950s, Rumely v. United States, concluded that a publisher had a right to refuse to 
reveal the names of his customers to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activi-
ties; but the court’s reasoning rested on anonymous speech principles that applied be-
yond the press-as-industry and would have covered nonprofessional distributors of leaf-
lets or pamphlets.  197 F.2d 166, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff’d on other grounds, 345 U.S. 
41 (1953).  The opinion repeatedly treated “books, pamphlets and other writings” 
equally, id. at 173, 174, and stressed the value of protecting attempts to influence pub-
lic opinion—an activity in which nonmedia actors have long participated, id. at 175.    
307 See, e.g., Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 300 P.2d 163, 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) 
(“[M]embers of the press are in the same position as other members of the public and 
have no greater right to be present at court hearings than has any other member of 
the public,” and therefore “[t]he freedom of the press is in no way involved in this 
proceeding.”); United Press Ass’ns v. Valente, 123 N.E.2d 777, 783 (N.Y. 1954) (“The 
fact that petitioners are in the business of disseminating news gives them no special 
right or privilege, not possessed by other members of the public.”). 
308 See, e.g., Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543, 547 (N.D. 1960) 
(concluding that “the freedom of the press” gives “plaintiff as a newspaper . . . no 
greater right of inspection than that given to the public generally”); Trimble v. John-
ston, 173 F. Supp. 651, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1959) (same). 
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specially-protected cases.  Some of these cases seem to be motivated by 
some lower courts’ unease with the First Amendment jurisprudence 
announced by the Court in recent decades—especially in libel cases—
and are aimed at minimizing the scope of those protections.  Other 
cases seem to be motivated by other lower courts’ desire to extend 
First Amendment protections, especially in cases of press access to pri-
vate property, but to do so in a limited way. 
But whatever the motivation, the press-as-industry-specially-
protected cases represent a minority view:  most lower court cases have 
continued to follow the all-speakers-equal model.309  Below, I discuss 
both the press-as-industry-specially-protected cases and the cases that 
reject this view, arranged by topic:  (a) cases involving a newsgather-
er’s privilege; (b) cases involving communicative torts (chiefly libel); 
(c) cases involving claimed First Amendment exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws; (d) cases involving a claimed First Amendment 
right to access government operations, government property, and pri-
vate property; and (e) campaign speech cases. 
A.  The Newsgatherer’s Privilege 
The first decision rejecting the all-speakers-equal model—the dis-
trict court decision in In re Caldwell,310 which was largely reversed by 
the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes—was a newsgatherer’s privi-
lege decision.  Caldwell did not determine whether the privilege would 
follow the mass-communications-more-protected model or the press-
as-industry-specially-protected model.  But lower court cases consider-
ing this issue have nearly unanimously rejected the press-as-industry-
 
309 See, for example, cases rejecting the journalist’s privilege infra note 311 and 
cases rejecting a media/nonmedia distinction in libel cases infra note 321. 
310 See 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal.) (ruling that a journalist’s testimony before 
a grand jury should not “reveal confidential associations that impinge upon the effec-
tive exercise of his First Amendment right to gather news for dissemination to the pub-
lic through the press”), vacated, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  Garland v. Torre, written by then-Judge Stewart shortly 
before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, noted “that we are not dealing here 
with the use of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper’s 
confidential sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of the news source is of 
doubtful relevance or materiality.”  259 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1958).  This seems to 
suggest that a privilege might be available if the news source is indeed “of doubtful rel-
evance or materiality,” but the opinion never said outright that such a privilege was 
available, and noted in a footnote two cases “to the effect that a journalist’s profession-
al status does not entitle him to sources of news inaccessible to others.”  Id. at 548 n.4 
(citing Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Valente, 123 
N.E.2d 777). 
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specially-protected model:  some reject any First Amendment news-
gatherer’s privilege, reasoning that Justice Powell’s concurrence 
doesn’t undercut the majority opinion,311 and others accept the privi-
lege but apply it equally to non-press-as-industry newsgatherers. 
Thus, the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, and several district courts together have 
held that would-be book authors,312 professors doing research for a 
possible future article,313 a film student and a professor trying to pro-
duce a documentary film,314 a political candidate,315 and political advo-
cacy groups316 were all potentially eligible for the privilege on the same 
terms as ordinary journalists.  The common threshold requirement 
seems to be that the newsgatherer, “at the inception of the investiga-
tory process, had the intent to disseminate to the public the infor-
mation obtained through the investigation.”317  The newsgatherer 
need not be a member of the press-as-industry. 
The only newsgatherer’s privilege case I could find that seemed to 
endorse the press-as-industry-specially-protected view is People v. 
LeGrand, a 1979 New York intermediate appeals court case.318  The 
 
311 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1148 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 334 
(N.J. 1978). 
312 See Ayala v. Ayers, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1250 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Shoen v. Shoen, 
5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D.D.C. 1979); see also In re 
Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128-30 (3d Cir. 1998) (endorsing Shoen and von Bulow, though 
concluding that they were inapplicable to the case at hand). 
313 See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1998); see also 
United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 938, 941 (D. Mass. 1971) (concluding that academ-
ics should be treated the same way as journalists, but deciding that the privilege was 
inapplicable for other reasons (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938))). 
314 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing 
Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452). 
315 See In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Involving File No. 17139, 720 
N.W.2d 807, 816 (Minn. 2006). 
316 See Schiller v. City of New York, 245 F.R.D. 112, 118-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Build-
ers Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 96-1121, 1998 WL 111702, at *4-5 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 12, 1998).   
317 Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 143. 
318 I don’t count the district court and court of appeals decisions in Stanford Daily 
v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev’d, 
436 U.S. 547 (1978), because they were reversed, and because it isn’t clear which mod-
el they adopted.  The decisions addressed whether searches of newspaper premises vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment, id. at 125-26, so the courts had no occasion to decide 
whether they would have reached the same result as to the search of the office of a 
would-be book author or a creator of non–mass communications speech, such as pick-
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LeGrand court rejected a newsgatherer’s privilege claim raised by 
someone researching a book about a mafia family, reasoning: 
 Under these facts, I conclude that the author’s interest in protecting 
the confidential information is manifestly less compelling than that of a 
journalist or newsman.  To report the news and remain valuable to their 
employer and the public,  professional journalists must constantly culti-
vate sources of information.  Newsmen must also maintain their credibil-
ity and trustworthiness as repositories of confidential information. 
 However, appellant, like most authors, is an independent contrac-
tor whose success invariably depends more on the researching of pub-
lic and private documents, other treatises, and background interviews, 
rather than on confidential rapport with his sources of information.  
Thus, his contacts with confidential sources, being minimal vis-a-vis 
those of an investigative journalist, would be far less likely to have any 
impact on the free flow of information which the First Amendment is 
designed to protect. 
 The court defers comment at this time with respect to some future 
situation in which an author’s role would be clearly that of an investiga-
tive journalist whose work product will be published in book form.
319
 
The court thus distinguished “professional journalist[s]” from those 
who are only one-time authors, endorsing the press-as-industry-
specially-protected approach.  But I know of no other newsgatherer’s 
privilege cases that take this view. 
State statutes—whether related to newsgatherer’s privileges, retrac-
tions in libel cases, campaign finance law, or other subjects—often do 
single out the institutional media, and sometimes even just certain seg-
ments of the media.320  But such line drawing is part of what legislators 
do.  When the broad constitutional language “freedom . . . of the press” 
is involved, courts deciding journalist’s privilege cases have been unwill-
ing to distinguish the press-as-industry from other newsgatherers. 
 
eting or in-person speeches.  And while the district court did reject the view “that 
newspapers, reporters and photographers have no greater Fourth Amendment protec-
tions than other citizens,” id. at 133-34, it spoke more broadly of the principle that 
“[t]he First Amendment is not superfluous,” id.  The court didn’t argue that the Free 
Press Clause “is not superfluous,” and thus that the Clause provides special protection 
to the press-as-industry that the rest of the First Amendment denies to other speakers.  
Indeed, the court cited, among other cases, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), 
which protected an organization that was not part of the press-as-industry.  353 F. 
Supp. at 134. 
319 People v. LeGrand, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 257-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
320 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4) (West 1999) (defining reporter nar-
rowly by requiring a large time commitment and future large-scale public dissemina-
tion of the work). 
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B.  Communicative Torts 
Many communicative torts decisions in the lower courts have con-
tinued to follow the all-speakers-equal model.321  Moreover, most of 
the lower court cases that have departed from this approach have 
done so with regard to speech that was never intended for mass dis-
semination, such as credit reports,322 employer references related to 
ex-employees,323 complaints about a franchisee sent to a franchisor,324 
complaints sent to the government,325 business responses to customer 
complaints,326 people talking to their coworkers, supervisors, or neigh-
 
321 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207 (2011); Flamm v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 
2000); In re IBP Confidential Bus. Docs. Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1986); Gar-
cia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410 (10th Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 
649 (3rd Cir. 1980);  Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Doe v. 
Alaska Superior Ct., 721 P.2d 617, 628 (Alaska 1986); Antwerp Diamond Exch. of Am. 
v. Better Bus. Bureau, 637 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. 1981); Miller v. Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr. 
359, 364 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1022 n.23 (D.C. 
1990); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984); Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 653 
P.2d 1145, 1149-50 (Haw. 1982); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 
677-78 (La. 2006); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (Md. 1976); Shaari v. 
Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 925, 928-29 (Mass. 1998); Henry v. Halli-
burton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 784 (Mo. 1985); Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212, 216-17 
(Mont. 1982); Wheeler v. Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 508 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Neb. 1993); 
Berkery v. Estate of Stuart, 988 A.2d 1201, 1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); 
Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 653 P.2d 511, 520 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 
724 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (endorsing Hammerhead Enters. v. Breze-
noff, 551 F. Supp. 1360, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), which contains a more detailed First 
Amendment discussion); Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ohio 2001); 
DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980); Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, 720 
S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1989); 
Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778, 783 (W. Va. 1986); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 580B cmt. e (1977). 
322 See, e.g., Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1971); 
Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Vt. 1983), aff’d on 
other grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), but overruled in part on other grounds by Lent v. Hun-
toon, 470 A.2d 1162 (Vt. 1983). 
323 See, e.g., Vinson v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984); 
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Minn. 1980); Berg v. Cons. 
Freightways, Inc., 421 A.2d 831, 834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 
228 N.W.2d 737, 745-46 (Wis. 1975). 
324 See, e.g., Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362-65 
(Or. 1977), reaffirmed in Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777 (Or. 1979). 
325 See, e.g., Swengler v. ITT Corp. Electro-Optical Prods. Div., 993 F.2d 1063, 1071 
n.5 (4th Cir. 1993).  The court did not consider the possibility that such speech should 
have been fully protected by the Petition Clause, even if not by the Free Speech Clause. 
326 Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 665 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).  Perry actu-
ally involved a newspaper and a newspaper editor as defendants, but the court con-
cluded that their speech—sending a letter to a customer in response to a complaint—
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bors,327 and the like.  So though such cases often say they are drawing 
a media/nonmedia distinction, their results could be consistent with 
the mass-communications-more-protected view, and not just the press-
as-industry-specially-protected view. 
Indeed, some cases rejecting the all-speakers-equal model express-
ly hold that nonmedia speakers should be as protected as the media 
when they speak through the media—for instance, through letters to 
the editor or as people interviewed for news stories.  This perspective 
fits well within the mass-communications-more-protected view.328 
I could find only a handful of cases holding that ordinary citizens 
get less First Amendment protection than press-as-industry speakers 
would, even when the ordinary citizens are communicating to the 
public.  Most of these cases deny nonmedia defendants the benefit of 
the prohibition—established by the Supreme Court’s holding in Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc.—on awards of presumed damages in the absence 
of a showing of “actual malice.”329 
 
was not as protected as speech intended for mass communication.  Id.  Perry’s reason-
ing seems inconsistent with Nodar v. Galbreath, which rejected the press-as-industry-
specially-protected view.  See Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (“We 
believe . . . that the constitutionally protected right to discuss, comment upon, criti-
cize, and debate . . . is extended not only to the organized media but to all persons.”).  
Since Perry doesn’t cite Nodar, it is possible that the parties and the court were unaware 
of Nodar, which was decided less than three months before the decision in Perry, and 
likely after the briefing in Perry was complete. 
327 See, e.g., Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), disap-
proved by Miller v. Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc., 943 P.2d 10, 18 (Colo. App. 1996); Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 
523 A.2d 1356, 1361 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 
S.W.2d 270, 277 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). 
328 See, e.g., Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1175 n.21 (S.D. 
Cal. 1999) (applying same standard to a nonmedia defendant doctor as to media de-
fendants because the doctor’s statements were published through the media), rev’d on 
other grounds, 264 F.3d 832, 847 (9th Cir. 2001); Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
544 N.W.2d 21, 26 n.5 (Minn. 1996) (“Because Tatone’s communication utilized the 
television media, we place her in the same legal position . . . as we place [the media 
defendants].”); Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1985) (“Whatever may be the rule with respect to purely private defamations hav-
ing no nexus to the public media, we conclude, as have virtually all State and lower 
Federal Courts passing on the issue . . . that a nonmedia individual defendant who uti-
lizes a public medium for the publication of matter deemed defamatory should be ac-
corded the same constitutional privilege as the medium itself.” (citation omitted)); see 
also Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 465 A.2d 953, 962-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1983) (reaching a similar result, though chiefly because of journalists’ right to gather 
news from non-press-as-industry speakers and the public’s right to hear such speakers). 
329 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). 
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1.  Political Advertisements and Letters to the Editor 
Fleming v. Moore concluded that a real estate developer who 
bought a newspaper ad to criticize a citizen opponent of a develop-
ment project was a “non-media defendant,” and thus wasn’t protected 
under Gertz.330  (This sort of speaker would be the analog of the sign-
ers of the ad in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, if Sullivan had been a 
private figure.)  Wheeler v. Green held the same as to a racehorse owner 
who sent a letter to the editor of a horse racing newsletter, alleging 
that a horse trainer had behaved unethically.331  Similarly, Johnson v. 
Clark denied Gertz protection to the author of a letter to the editor of a 
newspaper complaining about an attorney’s alleged mishandling of 
the estate of the author’s uncle.332 
2.  Books and Authors’ Own Websites 
Lassiter v. Lassiter treated a self-published author—a woman who 
wrote a book accusing her ex-husband of physical abuse and adul-
tery—as a nonmedia defendant, and held that only “media defend-
ants” could assert First Amendment defenses to private figures’ def-
amation claims.333  Because of this, the court concluded that the First 
 
330 275 S.E.2d 632, 638 (Va. 1981).  Fleming was a real estate developer who was 
trying to develop a tract; Moore was a neighbor who spoke out against the application 
at local Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors meetings. Id. at 634.  Fleming 
responded by buying a newspaper ad captioned “RACISM,” which asserted that Moore 
(who was white) opposed the development because it would likely have many black 
residents.  Id. at 634 & n.3.   
 In this case, the court held that even presumed damages were unavailable as a 
matter of state law because the statement wasn’t actionable per se (i.e., didn’t accuse 
the plaintiff of a crime or conduct incompatible with proper performance of his pro-
fession).  Id. at 636-67.  But the broader holding was that presumed damages could be 
awarded in some libel cases (those that fit the state-law libel per se rules) brought by 
private figure plaintiffs against nonmedia defendants, even without a showing of “actu-
al malice.”  Id. 
331 593 P.2d 777, 784, 787-89 (Or. 1979).  The court held that punitive damages in 
defamation cases were foreclosed by the Oregon Constitution, but allowed the recov-
ery of presumed damages.  Id. at 788-89. 
332 484 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1250-51, 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2007).  Johnson didn’t cite Gertz 
directly, didn’t discuss the First Amendment, and didn’t cite the Florida Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Nodar v. Galbreath, which rejected any media/nonmedia distinction.  
See Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (“If common-law remedies for 
defamation are to be constitutionally restricted [under Gertz] in actions against media 
defendants, they should also be restricted in actions against private, non-media speak-
ers and publishers.”).  Rather, Johnson relied on only two pre-Gertz cases and a post-Gertz 
Florida Court of Appeals case that didn’t discuss the media/nonmedia distinction. 
333 456 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 280 Fed. App’x 503 
(6th Cir. 2008).  
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Amendment did not bar holding the defendant strictly liable for 
false and defamatory factual assertions, notwithstanding the Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. rule that barred such strict liability in many cases.334  
Likewise, Ben-Tech Industrial Automation v. Oakland University treated 
a professor as a nonmedia defendant with regard to material posted 
on his website, and thus didn’t apply the Gertz requirement that pu-
nitive and presumed damages be awarded only on a showing of “ac-
tual malice.”335 
 
334 The court ultimately concluded that the defendant’s speech was either true or 
mere opinion and thus not actionable under Kentucky law.  456 F. Supp. 2d at 879, 882.  
The court might have reached the same First Amendment result—that strict liability 
might be allowed if the statements were proven to be false factual assertions—another 
way.  The court concluded that the speech was “about a matter that is not of public in-
terest,” id. at 880, which is consistent with the plurality view in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 & n.7 (1985) (plurality opinion), which gave 
as an example of speech on matters of purely private concern a false claim that a 
neighbor is a “whore.”  Dun & Bradstreet in turn had held that speech on non-public-
concern matters was not covered by the Gertz rule that presumed punitive damages 
could be awarded even in the absence of “actual malice.”  And the logic of Dun & 
Bradstreet may be read to suggest that statements that are not of “public concern” are 
likewise not covered by the Gertz prohibition on strict liability. Compare, e.g., Sleem v. 
Yale Univ., 843 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (so interpreting Gertz), Ross v. 
Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (D.V.I. 1991) (suggesting that Gertz might be so 
interpreted), and Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1505 n.21 
(D.D.C. 1987) (likewise), with L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 
1425, 1431 (D. Conn. 1986) (suggesting the contrary).  Nonetheless, this was not the 
reasoning that the Lassiter court used to decide that the First Amendment protections 
did not apply; rather, it limited those protections to “public officials and public figures 
and/or against media defendants.” 
335 See No. 247471, 2005 WL 50131, *6-7 & n.9 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005) 
(concluding that “[t]he actual malice standard d[id] not apply,” but rather a negli-
gence standard did, since the case “involv[ed] a private plaintiff, a non-media defend-
ant, and alleged defamatory statements regarding a private matter”).  The court didn’t 
cite Gertz, but its articulation of the First Amendment rules suggested that it was con-
sidering whether the Gertz rule was applicable here.  The result might have been the 
same regardless of whether the defendant was a media defendant, because Dun & 
Bradstreet—which the court also didn’t cite—had held that speech on “private mat-
ter[s]” was not covered by the Gertz rule.  But I include the case in this Section because 
the court did rely on the defendant’s status as a “non-media” entity. 
 The professor posted a student paper that happened to contain defamatory allega-
tions as an example for other students, apparently without the intent of endorsing the 
allegations.  This might conceivably be seen as speech that’s not part of mass commu-
nications because it is addressed only to a small audience (even though it was theoreti-
cally available to everyone on the Internet).  Id. at *1.  But the court didn’t rely on any 
such argument, and instead simply stated that the First Amendment libel rules are for 
press-as-industry defendants alone.  Id. at *6 n.8.   
 The defendant didn’t raise, see Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellee Donald O. 
Mayer, Ben-Tech Indus. Automation, No. 247471, 2005 WL 25531938, and the court 
didn’t discuss a possible defense under 47 U.S.C. § 230, which has been held to im-
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3.  Quoted Statements to the Media 
Five cases have held that people who spoke to the media did not 
have the full First Amendment protection that the media itself had, 
even though the speakers were expressing their views through mass 
communications technology.  Stokes v. CBS, Inc. so held with regard to 
on-camera interviews “built around the statements of” the defendant, 
a detective investigating a case.336  Denny v. Mertz reached the same 
conclusion about a defendant’s statement to a reporter about why the 
defendant—the CEO of a large company—had fired the plaintiff, his 
general counsel.337 
Guilbeaux v. Times of Acadiana, Inc. also came to the same conclu-
sion regarding a casino developer’s statements to a newspaper about 
 
munize online speakers from liability when they choose to post material provided by 
others.  See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
listserv and website operator is immunized from liability for posting an allegedly de-
famatory email authored by a third party).   
336 25 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 1998).  The exact effect of the detec-
tive’s nonmedia status wasn’t entirely clear, but it seems to have been that the detective 
could be held liable for compensatory damages, even without a showing of negligence, 
so long as he acted out of “actual ill-will or a design causelessly and wantonly to injure 
plaintiff.”  Id. at 1002 (quoting Bol v. Cole, 561 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. 1997)).  The 
court specifically held that “on [the] issue of [presumed or punitive] damages, private 
parties ‘utiliz[ing] the television media’ are placed ‘in the same legal position’ as me-
dia defendants.”  Id. at 1003 (third alteration in original) (quoting Richie v. Para-
mount Picture Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 26 n.5 (Minn. 1996)). 
 Likewise, in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, No. 11-0057, 2011 WL 5999334 (D. 
Or. Nov. 30, 2011)—a case that came too late to be included in the text—the court 
concluded that a blogger who published a blog that was sharply critical of plaintiff was 
not a member of the “media,” and thus not entitled to the Gertz rule that “plaintiffs 
cannot recover damages without proof that defendant was at least negligent and may 
not recover presumed damages absent proof of ‘actual malice.’” Id. at *5. In the 
court’s view, Gertz extended only to speakers as to whom there was some 
evidence of (1) any education in journalism; (2) any credentials or proof of any 
affiliation with any recognized news entity; (3) proof of adherence to journalistic 
standards such as editing, fact-checking, or disclosures of conflicts of interest; 
(4) keeping notes of conversations and interviews conducted; (5) mutual under-
standing or agreement of confidentiality between the defendant and his/her 
sources; (6) creation of an independent product rather than assembling writings 
and postings of others; or (7) contacting “the other side” to get both sides of a 
story.  Without evidence of this nature, defendant is not “media.” 
Id. 
337 See 318 N.W.2d 141, 152-53 (Wisc. 1982) (“[W]e do not read Gertz as requiring 
that the protections provided therein apply to non-media defendants nor . . . do we 
consider it good public policy to so decide.”). 
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another casino developer.338  Kanaga v. Gannett Co. held the same 
about a patient’s statements to the media accusing a doctor of rec-
ommending unnecessary hysterectomies.339  And Landrum v. Board of 
Commissioners suggested that any possible First Amendment barriers to 
tort lawsuits for disclosure of allegedly private facts (there, that a po-
lice officer had failed a marijuana test340) did not apply to a nonmedia 
defendant who had conveyed the information to newspapers.341 
4.  Nonmedia Defendants Generally 
The Florida Supreme Court’s standard jury instructions expressly 
put the burden of proving truth on nonmedia defendants,342 even 
though Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps requires that the burden 
of proving falsehood be placed on plaintiffs in cases with media de-
fendants involving matters of public concern.343  The comments to the 
instructions seem to treat “media defendant”344 as meaning “a member 
of the press or broadcast media,”345 which suggests that the court was 
endorsing the press-as-industry-specially-protected view. 
 
338 693 So. 2d 1183, 1188 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Sassone v. Elder, 626 So. 2d 
345, 351 (La. 1993)). 
339 687 A.2d 173, 181-82 (Del. 1996).  A later decision in the same case concluded 
that Kanaga was a nonmedia defendant despite her having written several articles in 
the past, and “her (unsuccessful) efforts to publish an article about [the incident giv-
ing rise to the libel lawsuit] in a magazine.”  No. 92C-12-182-JOH, 1998 WL 729585, at 
*4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 10, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 750 A.2d 1174 (Del. 2000). 
340 685 So. 2d 382, 386 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
341 Id. at 392 (“We reject the [Orleans Levee Board]’s argument that Mr. Landrum 
must show actual malice in order to recover from the [Board] for an invasion of priva-
cy.  While such a requirement has been discussed in cases involving media defendants, 
we find nothing in Louisiana law to suggest that a non-media defendant can only be 
liable for an invasion of privacy involving a falsehood.” (citations omitted)). 
342 See In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1), 575 So. 2d 194, 197-200 
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam).  The court noted that “our approval for publication is not an 
adjudication on the merits of the form, substance, or correctness of the instructions 
nor an approval of the notes and comments of the committee.  Any litigant, in an ap-
propriate forum, may raise any issue in connection with their use.”  Id. at 195 (quoting 
In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 88-2), 541 So. 2d 90, 90 (Fla. 1989) (per 
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nonetheless, the court appears to sug-
gest that the instructions are a sound statement of the law.  See id. (“We . . . decline the 
invitation of respondents to remand to the Committee for reconsideration of the [le-
gal issues] raised.”). 
343 475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986).  The court in Hepps specifically noted that it was 
not deciding whether the same standard would apply to nonmedia defendants.  Id. at 
779 n.4. 
344 575 So. 2d at 199-200. 
345 Id. at 195. 
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Finally, Senna v. Florimont concluded that the inquiry into whether 
speech is on a matter of public concern for First Amendment libel law 
purposes should have a separate subprong for media defendants:  if 
“published by a media or media-related defendant, a news story con-
cerning public health and safety, a highly regulated industry, or alle-
gations of criminal or consumer fraud or a substantial regulatory vio-
lation will, by definition, involve a matter of public interest or con-
concern.”346  But it seems very likely that any item published through 
mass communications technology about those subjects, whether by 
the media or otherwise, would indeed be found to be on a matter of 
public concern.347  And the court gave commercial advertising—which 
is generally a less protected category of speech, and which was the 
speech at issue in the case itself—as one example of non-public-
concern speech.348  So it seems unlikely that the media/nonmedia dis-
tinction would in practice play a significant role under the Senna rule. 
C.  Antidiscrimination Law 
Four dissenters in Associated Press v. NLRB (1937) took the view 
that the Free Press Clause secured the Associated Press’s right to re-
fuse to employ union members as writers.349  And the Washington Su-
preme Court’s 1997 decision in Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. 
seemed to follow that dissent.350 
Washington state law bars employers from discriminating against 
employees based on their political activities.351  The Tacoma-based 
 
346 958 A.2d 427, 443-44 (N.J. 2008). 
347 Indeed, the court in Senna specifically stated that “speech concerning signifi-
cant risks to public health and safety” would always qualify as involving a matter of pub-
lic concern.  Id. at 444.   
348 Id.  In fact, the Third Circuit, which includes New Jersey, has held that tradi-
tional First Amendment libel analysis doesn’t apply to cases brought based on com-
mercial advertisements.  See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 
F.2d 914, 931-33 (3d Cir. 1990).  Another district court case out of the Third Circuit, 
Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., likewise held that “in defamation cases involving commercial 
speech by non-media defendants about private individuals, even when that speech 
touches on matters of public concern, the speech is not entitled to elevated levels of 
First Amendment protection, and therefore proof of falsity [under Hepps] is not re-
quired.”  29 Med. L. Rep. 1513, 1521 (E.D. Pa. 2000).   
349 301 U.S. 103, 136-41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also supra subsec-
tion VI.B.2. 
350 See 936 P.2d 1123, 1128-33 (Wash. 1997) (holding that “editorial control is a 
necessary component of the free press and a state law infringing thereon will be un-
constitutional as applied”). 
351 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.680 (West 2006). 
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News Tribune demoted a reporter for violating the newspaper’s policy 
barring “high profile political activity” by its reporters, and the report-
er sued.352  The court concluded that the dismissal did violate the state 
statute, but the statute couldn’t be applied in this case because it con-
flicted with the newspaper’s First Amendment right to “editorial con-
trol,” which included control over who would write for its newspa-
per.353  Associated Press v. NLRB, the court held, was “limited to the 
[National Labor Relations Act] and union activity.”354 
But it’s not clear whether the Nelson decision falls in the all-
speakers-equal” category, the mass-communications-more-protected 
category, or the press-as-industry-specially-protected category.  
Though the decision often mentions “free press” rights, it also often 
refers to “free speech” rights and  “First Amendment” rights.  The 
main precedent it relies on, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,355 
though a newspaper case, has been equally applied to non-press-as-
industry speech, such as a business’s right to choose what to include in 
its mailings,356 and non-mass-communications speech, such as a parade 
organizer’s right to choose the floats that appear in its parade.357  And 
the logic of the Tornillo opinion would likewise apply to a political 
campaign’s or political advocacy group’s choice of employees who 
would give speeches on behalf of the organization. 
In fact, today the strongest precedent for securing some First 
Amendment exemption from antidiscrimination laws is a nonmedia 
case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which held that the Boy Scouts of 
America has a First Amendment right to bar gays from being scout-
masters.358  The job of a scoutmaster, the Court noted, is to “incul-
 
352 Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125.   
353 Id. at 1131.   
354 Id. at 1132. 
355 See 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a state statute granting a political 
candidate the right to answer a newspaper’s criticism in print violates the First 
Amendment). 
356 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) 
(plurality opinion) (“The concerns that caused us to invalidate the compelled access 
rule in Tornillo apply to appellant as well as to the institutional press.  See First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 425 U.S., at 782-84.  Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S., at 452.”).  Jus-
tice Marshall’s concurrence in the judgment did not note any disagreement with the 
plurality on this matter.  Id. at 21-26. 
357 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 575-
76 (1995). 
358 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000).  Cases holding that religious organizations have a 
right to discriminate in choice of clergy under the Free Exercise Clause might also of-
fer an analogy, though more distant because they do not directly involve “the freedom 
of the speech, or of the press.”  See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 
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cate . . . values . . . both expressly and by example,”359 and because the 
organization opposes homosexuality, allowing openly gay scoutmas-
ters would interfere with the Boy Scouts’ ability to convey its mes-
sage.360  The Court thus seems committed to protecting, to some ex-
tent, organizations’ right to control their message by choosing those 
who speak on their behalf—the same right the newspaper asserted in 
Nelson.  Likewise, the three other lower court cases recognizing First 
Amendment exemptions from antidiscrimination laws involved speak-
ers who were not part of the press-as-industry:  Ku Klux Klan parade 
organizers361 and Nation of Islam organizers of single-sex lectures.362 
It’s not clear whether the rulings in Boy Scouts and the lower court 
cases would extend to employment discrimination, in which people’s 
livelihoods are at stake, and not just to the selection of group mem-
bers, volunteers, marchers, and audience members.  But Boy Scouts 
and the other cases show that speaking organizations are likely to have 
at least as strong a First Amendment right to discriminate as do print-
ing organizations.  Following Boy Scouts, then, any cases that track Nel-
son are likely to follow the all-speakers-equal model.363 
D.  Access to Government Operations and 
Government and Private Property 
The lower court cases that discuss whether the press is constitu-
tionally entitled to special access to government operations or to pri-
vate property generally follow the Court’s all-speakers-equal hold-
ings.364  Many courts do provide special access to the media, whether 
 
461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause bars judicial review of a 
church’s employment decisions); Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 
21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian 
Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 
1126-28 (Colo. 1996) (same); see also Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) 
(suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause might mandate exemptions from generally 
applicable laws if it is linked with a freedom of association claim). 
359 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 649-50.   
360 Id. at 653.  
361 Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 
F. Supp. 281, 289-90 (D. Md. 1988). 
362 City of Cleveland v. Nation of Islam, 922 F. Supp. 56, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1995); 
Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 762 N.E.2d 835, 841 (Mass. 2002). 
363 I have found no post-Nelson case so far that tracks Nelson in allowing newspa-
pers—or other speakers—to discriminate in choice of employees. 
364 See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 840 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that journalists have no greater rights of access under the First Amendment 
to city parking ticket records than does the public because “[t]he First Amendment 
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television or print.365  But they generally do not hold that the press-as-
industry has a constitutional right to such preferential treatment. 
I could find only four possible exceptions to this principle, all 
from 1971 to 1981, and all involving press exemptions from trespass 
law and from laws that limit access to crime scenes.  Two are New Jer-
sey appellate cases.  First, in Freedman v. New Jersey State Police, the court 
interpreted the New Jersey Constitution’s Free Press Clause to hold 
that reporters—including those from a university student newspa-
per—have a right to go into privately owned farmworker camps, not-
withstanding the property owners’ objections.366  Second, the court in 
State v. Lashinsky stated that in various newsgathering contexts “the 
reporter stands apart from the ordinary citizen,” though the court re-
fused to grant access to a crime scene in that particular case.367 
Two more are trial court cases from other jurisdictions.  In People 
v. Rewald, a New York trial court decided that a newspaper reporter 
seeking access to a migrant labor camp had a First Amendment ex-
emption from trespass law.368  Likewise, the federal district court deci-
sion in Allen v. Combined Communications held that a “reporter” facing a 
trespass claim should be immune from trespass law if (1) the reporter 
 
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not 
available to the public generally” (alteration in original) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972))); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 
520-22 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that journalists have no greater right than others to 
trespass on private property (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 
(1991))); Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding 
that “the press enjoys no constitutional right of physical access to courtroom exhibits,” 
notwithstanding Justice Brennan’s suggestion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment), that the press 
might have special constitutional access rights); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 902 n.70 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stating, in discussing a claimed 
right “to copy video and audio tapes that had been received as exhibits in a public 
criminal trial,” that “[u]nder the First Amendment, the press enjoys no greater access 
rights than the public generally”); In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling:  
Media and Non-Partisan Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 80 n.13 (N.J. 2009) (re-
jecting special access for the press to protected polling zones). 
365 Likewise, some legislatures have chosen to provide the institutional media with 
special access to other places, such as disaster areas.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 
409.5(d) (West 1999). 
366 343 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).  An earlier case, State v. 
Shack, suggested that this same result might be reached under state property law, 277 
A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971), but Freedman expressly relied on the New Jersey Constitu-
tion’s Free Press Clause, 343 A.2d at 150. 
367 404 A.2d 1121, 1128 (N.J. 1979) (quoting In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 350 (N.J. 
1978) (Handler, J., dissenting)). 
368 318 N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1971). 
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was unaware that he was trespassing, and (2) the property owner suf-
fered no “damage as a result of the trespass.”369 
These holdings, though, are likely no longer sound—at least 
where the federal First Amendment is concerned—after Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., which held that the press-as-industry gets no special 
exemption from generally applicable laws.370  This equal treatment 
principle would presumably include trespass laws that bar unauthor-
ized access to real property, given Cohen’s statements that “[t]he press 
may not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather 
news” and that the press gets no exemption from laws that bar unau-
thorized use of intellectual property.371 
Moreover, Marsh v. Alabama, on which Rewald relied, upheld Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses’ right to distribute religious pamphlets in a company 
town—not an activity obviously reserved to the press-as-industry—and 
may well extend to non-press-as-industry speakers.372  Likewise, Freed-
man relied on an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court decision that 
carved out an exception from state trespass law not just for the press, 
but also for public interest lawyers who were trying to help farmwork-
ers.373  To the extent that Freedman constitutionalized this right of ac-
cess for the press under the New Jersey Constitution’s Free Press 
Clause, its logic—coupled with the logic of the earlier decision—
suggests the same rule might apply to other speakers under the New 
Jersey Constitution’s Free Speech Clause. 
In any event, Freedman, Lashinsky, Rewald, and Allen are the only 
cases that I have found that can be read as taking the press-as-industry-
specially-protected view.  And even in New Jersey—the one jurisdic-
tion in which such decisions were handed down by appellate courts—
 
369 7 Med. L. Rep. 2417, 2420 (D. Colo. 1981); see also Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. 
Supp. 468, 471-72 (N.D. Tex.) (holding that the media had a right to videorecord an 
execution), rev’d, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The Constitution does not . . . 
require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by 
members of the public generally.” (citing Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974))). 
370 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). 
371 Id.  One could imagine different First Amendment rules for speakers’ claimed 
right of access to unenclosed land than for speakers’ access to others’ dwellings or of-
fices.  But Cohen’s point that the press-as-industry gets no special exemptions from gen-
erally applicable laws, compared to the rights of other speakers, applies equally to both 
kinds of trespass. 
372 326 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1946). 
373 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372-75 (N.J. 1971). 
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these cases have not seemed to produce further special constitutional 
treatment for the press-as-industry.374 
E.  Campaign Speech Restrictions 
As discussed above, statutory media exemptions from most cam-
paign finance laws have made it unnecessary for courts to decide 
whether the media is constitutionally entitled to such an exemption.375  
Nonetheless, at least three lower court decisions have confronted the 
question, and all adopted the all-speakers-equal position.  The district 
court decision in McConnell v. FEC upheld certain campaign speech 
restrictions on the grounds that the Free Press Clause and Free 
Speech Clause provide equivalent constitutional protection.376  A fed-
eral district court held that a city campaign finance ordinance that 
lacked a media exemption could constitutionally be applied to the 
media.377  And a Kentucky appellate court struck down certain cam-
paign speech restrictions, reasoning that a bar association had the same 
right as a newspaper to publish judicial candidate endorsements, be-
cause the “freedom of the press and freedom of speech” belong to all.378 
The Federal Election Commission, however, seems to view the 
federal election law media exemption—which is limited to broadcast-
ing and periodicals379 and thus excludes books,380 occasional newslet-
 
374 See, e.g., In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling:  Media and Non-
Partisan Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 80 n.13 (N.J. 2009) (rejecting special 
access for the press to protected polling zones); State v. Cantor, 534 A.2d 83, 86 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (rejecting special right for the press to violate laws against 
impersonating public officials). 
375 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.   
376 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 236 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff’d in 
part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010); see also supra note 289. 
377 Olson v. City of Golden, No. 07-1851, 2011 WL 3861433, at *9-10 (D. Colo. 
Sept. 1, 2011) (holding that newspapers, like other speakers, had to comply with the 
ordinance’s disclosure requirements and that “[i]n the absence of a press exemption 
like that in the [Federal Election Campaign Act], a court simply applies the regulation 
to the publisher of a specific publication”). 
378 Ky. Registry of Election Fin. v. Louisville Bar Ass’n, 579 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1979) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978)). 
379 See supra note 274. 
380 See, e.g., George Soros, MUR 5642, Statement of Reasons of Chairman Robert 
D. Lenhard and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub, at 2 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 
31, 2007), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/29044223685.pdf (de-
scribing proposed action against businessman George Soros for, among other things, 
printing and distributing a book containing statements opposing the reelection of 
George W. Bush and noting that the FEC general counsel—along with three commis-
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ters,381 and occasionally produced documentaries382—as tracking a 
First Amendment mandate.  Implicitly, then, the FEC appears to be 
taking a press-as-industry-specially-protected view of the First Amend-
ment.383  But I could find no court decision that agreed with the FEC 
on this. 
CONCLUSION 
The historical evidence points powerfully in one direction—
throughout American history, the dominant understanding of the 
“freedom of the press” has followed the press-as-technology model.  
This was likely the original meaning of the First Amendment.  It was 
almost certainly the understanding when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified.  It remained the largely unchallenged orthodoxy until 
about 1970. 
Since 1970, a few lower courts have adopted the press-as-industry 
model, but this has been a decidedly minority view.  The Supreme 
Court continues to provide equal treatment to speakers without re-
 
sioners—considered such book publishing as outside the federal election law media 
exemption); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Advisory Opinion 1987-8, at 5-6 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n May 4, 1987), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1987-08.pdf (ad-
vising that the media exemption does not apply to books).  
381 See, e.g., Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc., Advisory Opinion 1989-28, at 6 (Fed. 
Election Comm’n Feb. 14, 1990), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1989-
28.pdf (advising that the media exemption does not apply to occasionally published 
newsletters or nonprofit organizations); San Joaquin Valley Republican Assocs., Advi-
sory Opinion 1988-22, at 3 (Fed. Election Comm’n July 5, 1988), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1988-22.pdf (advising that occasionally published 
newsletters do not qualify for the media exemption).   
382 See, e.g., Citizens United, Advisory Opinion 2004-30, at 7 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/2004-30.pdf 
(stressing that Citizens United was not entitled to the media exemption because it 
“does not regularly produce documentaries or pay to broadcast them on television” 
and that “Citizens United has produced only two documentaries since its founding in 
1988 . . . neither of which it paid to broadcast on television”).  But see Citizens United, 
Advisory Opinion 2010-08, at 5 (Fed. Election Comm’n June 11, 2010), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202010-08.pdf (advising that Citizens United 
was entitled to the media exemption because it had by then produced a sufficient 
number of documentaries). 
383 See, e.g., Citizens United, Advisory Opinion 2010-08, at 3-5; Viacom, Inc., Advi-
sory Opinion 2003-34, at 3 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 19, 2003), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/2003-34.pdf.  The Viacom opinion did say that “[t]he 
Commission does not undertake a constitutional analysis in this advisory opinion,” but 
said this was so because “the press exemptions at 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(B)(i) and 
434(f)(3)(B)(i), [are] themselves clearly drawn with the First Amendment in mind.”  
Id. at 4.  This suggests that the FEC does itself see the First Amendment, like federal 
election law, as embodying the press-as-industry-specially-protected view. 
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gard to whether they are members of the press-as-industry.  And 
though several Supreme Court opinions have noted that the question 
remains open, the bulk of the precedent points toward equal treat-
ment for all speakers—or at least to equal treatment for all who use 
mass communications technology, whether or not they are members 
of the press-as-industry. 
This evidence can prove valuable in interpreting the Free Press 
Clause, to the extent we focus on its “purpose,”384 its “history,”385 the 
long-term traditions of the American legal system,386 and precedent.  It 
also suggests how we should interpret the Clause to the extent we fo-
cus on the “text.”387  Appeals to the text that the Framers ratified are 
naturally affected by what that text meant when it was ratified.  
“[T]ext and meaning ultimately are inseparable; to understand what 
the Framers said, we inevitably seek to discover what they meant.”388  
Even Justices who do not broadly endorse originalism accept that orig-
inal meaning evidence may be relevant to interpreting ambiguous le-
gal phrases, even if it is not dispositive.389 
And evidence of original meaning is especially valuable for as-
sessing arguments based on the supposed literal meaning of an am-
 
384 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
385 See supra Parts I-III.  The more conservative Justices have of course long 
stressed the significance of the historical understanding of constitutional provisions, 
including the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause.  See, e.g., Citizens Unit-
ed v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Alito & 
Thomas, JJ.); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 424 n.9 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Scalia, J.); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358-59 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
386 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584-85 (2010) (stressing, in an 
opinion joined by all the Justices except Justice Alito, the importance of considering 
“histor[y] and tradition[]” when determining whether a particular exception to First 
Amendment protection should be recognized (citation omitted)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (focusing on the value of considering tra-
ditions in the context of recognizing unenumerated rights); Eugene Volokh, Imple-
menting the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:  An Analytical Framework and a Re-
search Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1450-51 (2009) (discussing Justice Scalia’s 
occasional focus on post-Framing traditions, including in First Amendment cases). 
387 See supra note 3. 
388 Anderson, supra note 67, at 462. 
389 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brey-
er, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 274, 280-81 
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 626 (2003) (Brey-
er, J., majority opinion); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 787-89 
(1995) (Stevens, J., majority opinion); Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1983) (O’Connor, J., majority opinion). 
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biguous text.  By way of analogy, consider the Seventh Amendment, 
which secures the right to civil jury trial in “Suits at common law.”  
“Suits at common law” could refer to claims brought under Anglo-
American law as opposed to civil law, claims brought under judge-
made law as opposed to statutory law, or claims that have been histori-
cally decided by courts of law as opposed to equity or admiralty. 
Our legal system resolves this type of ambiguity not by adopting 
the meaning most commonly used today—which is probably judge-
made law as opposed to statutory law—but rather by considering how 
the ambiguous phrase was originally understood (claims of a sort his-
torically decided by courts of law, back when law, equity, and admiral-
ty courts were separate).390  The same reasoning applies to “the press.”  
Arguments based on an ambiguous text should consider which of the 
several possible meanings the text was originally understood to have. 
Of course, the Supreme Court has never limited itself to analyzing 
constitutional provisions based solely on historical sources.  Justices 
remain free to decide for themselves what they think best serves the 
values they deem protected by constitutional provisions.391  The goal of 
this Article is simply to say that an argument for a press-as-industry in-
terpretation of the Free Press Clause must rely on something other 
than original meaning, text, purpose, tradition, or precedent. 
 
390 See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (looking to 
Framing-era history in deciding that “[t]he phrase common law, found in this clause, is 
used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence”); see 
also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (referring to the historical understand-
ing of the Seventh Amendment as explained by the Court in Parsons); Golden v. Kel-
sey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 659 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). 
391 Many scholars have discussed this question of First Amendment theory, and I 
have nothing new to add to this debate.  For articles supporting the press-as-industry-
specially-protected view, see Dyk, supra note 6; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institu-
tional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005); Stewart, supra note 4; West, supra 
note 6; and Glen S. Dresser, Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions:  Dis-
tinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 902 (1974).  For articles 
supporting the mass-communications-more-protected view, see Robert D. Sack, Reflec-
tions on the Wrong Question:  Special Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 629, 633 (1979), which is perhaps limited to those speakers who publish 
“regularly”; and John J. Watkins & Charles W. Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of 
Defamation:  Of Fault, Nonmedia Defendants and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 823 (1984).  For articles supporting the all-speakers-equal view, see Anderson, su-
pra note 9; Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs:  
Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 91 (1987); 
Lange, supra note 17; Lewis, supra note 66; David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First 
Amendment:  In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1976); Steven 
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
915 (1978); and Van Alstyne, supra note 66. 
